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ABSTRACT 
 
In the current economic climate where credit crises, fluctuating commodity prices, poor governance, 
rising unemployment and declining consumer spending exist, risk management is of utmost importance. 
Proclaiming the existence of a risk management strategy is not enough to ensure that an enterprise 
achieves its objectives. The implementation of a holistic enterprise-wide risk management framework is 
required in order to execute strategies and achieve objectives effectively and efficiently  
Two types of risk management have emerged in industry, namely quantitative and qualitative risk 
management. On the one hand, qualitative analysis of risk can be done quickly and with minimal effort. 
However, these methods rely on the opinion of an individual or group of individuals to analyse the risks. 
The process may be highly subjective and does not fully consider the characteristics of the enterprise. 
This renders qualitative risk analysis as an ineffective singular strategy although it has been shown to be 
effective when the risks are well understood. 
Quantitative analysis, on the other hand, is particularly effective when the risks are not well understood. 
These methods have been shown to provide substantially more information regarding risks compared to 
qualitative analysis. However, many quantitative risk management methods presented in literature are 
studied in isolation and not within the context of a holistic risk management process. Furthermore, 
quantitative methods tend to be complex in nature and require a reasonable understanding of 
mathematical and statistical concepts in order to be used effectively. 
In view of this, there is a need for an enterprise risk management framework that emphasises the use of 
qualitative methods when the risks are well understood and quantitative methods when in-depth analyses 
of the risks are required. In this study, a systematic enterprise-wide risk management framework that 
incorporates both quantitative and qualitative methods was developed. The framework integrates these 
methods in a logical and holistic manner. The quantitative methods were found be to be largely practical 
while the qualitative methods presented are simple and easy to understand.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
In die huidige ekonomiese klimaat waar krediet krisisse, wisselende kommoditeitspryse, swak bestuur, 
stygende werkloosheid en dalende verbruikersbesteding bestaan, is risikobestuur van die uiterste belang.  
Die verkondiging van die bestaan van 'n risiko bestuurstrategie is nie genoeg om te verseker dat 'n 
onderneming sy doelwitte bereik nie. Die implementering van 'n holistiese ondernemings- breë 
risikobestuursraamwerk is nodig om strategieë en doelwitte doeltreffend en effektief te bereik. 
Twee tipe risikobestuur het na vore gekom in die bedryf, naamlik kwantitatiewe en kwalitatiewe 
risikobestuur. Aan die een kant , kan kwalitatiewe ontleding van risiko vinnig en met minimale 
inspanning gedoen word.  Hierdie metode is gewoontlik die mening van 'n individu of 'n groep individue 
wat die risiko ontleed. Die proses kan hoogs subjektief wees en nie ten volle die eienskappe van die 
onderneming in ag neem nie. Kwalitatiewe risiko-analise kan dan gesien word as 'n ondoeltreffende 
enkelvoud strategie maar dit is wel doeltreffend  wanneer daar verstaan word wat die  onderneming se 
risiko is. 
Kwantitatiewe analise, aan die ander kant, is veral effektief wanneer die risiko's nie goed verstaanbaar is 
nie. Hierdie metode het getoon dat daar  aansienlik meer inligting oor die risiko's, in vergelyking met 
kwalitatiewe ontleding, verskaf word. Daar is egter baie kwantitatiewe risikobestuur metodes wat in 
literatuur verskaf word, wat in isolasie bestudeer word en nie binne die konteks van 'n holistiese 
risikobestuur proses nie. Verder is, kwantitatiewe metodes geneig om kompleks van aard te wees en 
vereis 'n redelike begrip van wiskundige en statistiese konsepte sodat kwantitatiewe analise effektief  
kan wees. 
In lig hiervan, is daar 'n sterk behoefte vir  'n onderneming om 'n risikobestuursraamwerk in plek te het.   
Die risikobestuursraamwerk sal beide  die gebruik van kwalitatiewe metodes, wanneer die risiko goed 
verstaan word, en kwantitatiewe metodes, wanneer daar in diepte-ontledings van die risiko is, 
beklemtoon. In hierdie studie was 'n sistematiese onderneming-breë risikobestuursraamwerk ontwikkel 
wat beide kwantitatiewe en kwalitatiewe metodes insluit.  Die raamwerk integreer hierdie metodes in 'n 
logiese en holistiese wyse. Die kwantitatiewe metodes is gevind om grootliks prakties te wees, terwyl 
die kwalitatiewe metodes wat aangebied word, eenvoudig en maklik is om te verstaan. 
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Chapter 1 | Introduction 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The need for enhanced corporate governance and effective enterprise risk management (ERM) in the 
wake of large corporate failures and the ensuing losses has become evident in the last few years. These 
losses can be partially attributed to uninformed decision making and poor risk management (Steinberg et 
al. 2004). Although most enterprises recognise the need for risk management and benefits thereof, 
formal risk analysis techniques are seldom used owing to a lack of knowledge and doubts of the 
suitability of those methods to their specific enterprise (Dey 2010). 
1.1.1 Risk Defined  
Risk is an uncertain event that, should it occur, will have an effect on the achievement of the enterprise 
objectives (Steinberg et al. 2004; ISO 31000:2009, Risk Management—Principles and Guidelines 2009). 
An effect is a deviation from the normal or expected conditions. In terms of risk, this effect can be 
positive or negative (Al-Bahar & Krandall 1990). Thus, mitigating the effects of negative risk and 
enhancing the effect of positive risk ensures that objectives are achieved. Risk is intrinsic in all 
enterprise operations (Kwak & LaPlace 2005). Thus it is crucial to identify and analyse the associated 
uncertainty (Ward 2003). 
1.1.2 Risk Management 
Risk management is defined as the systematic process of identifying, assessing and responding to events 
that may potentially affect objectives (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008). Risk assessment has been defined 
as the measurement of the risk impact and likelihood (ISO 31000:2009, Risk Management—Principles 
and Guidelines 2009). The expected loss or threat level of a risk is calculated as the product of the risk 
impact and probability (INCOSE 2007). Risk management can be applied throughout an enterprise as 
well as within specific functional groups such as projects or departments. While all enterprises 
implement risk management to some extent, establishing principles and guidelines that should be 
satisfied when performing risk management increases the effectiveness of the process (ISO 31000:2009, 
Risk Management—Principles and Guidelines 2009).  
1.1.3 Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Management  
Regardless of the extent of implementation or established principles, business owners frequently rely 
solely on experience and intuition to manage risks (Smit & Watkins 2012). In many cases, this approach 
is sufficient. However, as the risks increase in complexity, further analysis is required. Quantitative 
methods can be used to provide further analysis (Azari et al. 2011). Incorporating both qualitative and 
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quantitative methods into a systematic enterprise risk management approach, makes it possible to 
identify risks that require further analysis (Turner & Ketelaar 2005). 
Risks that require further analysis are called critical risks. By contrast, non-critical risks do not require 
further analysis (Keizer, Vos & Halman 2005). Through identification of critical risks, management is 
able to allocate more resources to the control of these risks while simultaneously ensuring that non-
critical risks are not over-analysed (See Figure 1-1). 
 
 
Figure 1-1: Diagnosing risks for qualitative or quantitative assessment 
 
It must be noted that it is impossible to completely remove the qualitative aspects of risk management 
since the uncertainty associated with risks is rooted in human influences and behaviour. Thus, risk 
management will always include an inherent subjective and qualitative aspect (Chapman 1990). 
1.1.4 Core Risk Management Functions 
In general, three core risk management actions exist, namely risk identification, risk assessment and risk 
response strategy (See Figure 1-2). Thus these actions will be the focus of this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 1-2: Core risk management functions 
NO
YES
Diagnose Critical
Qualitative 
Assessment
Risk Response
Strategy
Quantitative 
Assessment
Risk Event
Risk 
Identification
Risk 
Assessment
Risk Response
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Identification and assessment of the risks are the most important steps, and usually a major source of 
difficulty (Azari et al. 2011). As such, risk identification and assessment will determine the importance 
and subsequently the amount of attention that a particular risk is given (Zhi 1995). Assessment of the 
risk also determines the risk response strategy to be adopted. Thus, it is important to properly identify 
and assess the threat level of all risks (Stewart & Fortune 1995). 
The current approaches towards risk identification are diverse and range from using past experience, 
brainstorming sessions and interviews. Although these approaches are widely accepted, the risk manager 
should be aware of factors affecting each approach and which would most be appropriate for a specific 
working environment. It is often the case that the factors that affect these approaches’ processes are not 
considered (Chapman 2001). 
A common method used to determine the risk likelihood and impact is rating systems. This method 
involves scoring the risk likelihood and impact a given scale, usually 1 to 5.  
The risk response strategy is chosen by calculating the risk threat level, which is the product of the 
likelihood and impact. Depending on whether the threat level is high, medium or low, a manager would 
be advised to select a specific risk response strategy (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008).  
Industry studies have shown that the choice of a risk response strategy is primarily associated with 
attitude of management towards the perceived threat and not empirical (Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008). 
1.2 Enterprise Risk Management Processes 
Risk management has evolved and been adapted for use in specific industries over the years. However, 
the 3 core functions (See Figure 1-2) of risk management have always been included in some form or 
the other. Steinberg et al. have developed a risk management process that can be implemented at every 
level within an enterprise. This process is aptly named Enterprise Risk Management (Steinberg et al. 
2004). The Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) model incorporated the core risk management functions 
and was used as a guideline to identify the steps required in an effective risk management process.  
There are eight important and interrelated concepts that encompass ERM. These are: 
1. Internal Environment  
Internal environment is determined by the behaviour of individuals within an enterprise as well the 
values and ethics embodied within the enterprise. These attributes include integrity, honesty and 
competence. 
2. Objective Setting  
Objectives must exist before the effect of risks can be measured. ERM objective setting processes help 
management set objectives that are consistent with the enterprise’s mission.  
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3. Risk Identification  
Risks that may affect objectives are identified. This process can involve using data from internal and 
external sources. Identification of risks also includes risk classification. 
4. Risk Assessment 
Identified risks are first prioritised and then their criticality is determined. Thereafter, the impact and 
likelihood of the risks is determined.  
5. Risk response strategy  
Risks are usually responded to in one of four general ways, namely avoiding, reducing, sharing and 
accepting the risk. The appropriate response can be chosen by either qualitative or quantitative methods. 
6. Control Activities  
These are procedures that are developed to ensure that the risk is mitigated according to the risk 
response strategy. When the risk is accepted no actions are taken. 
7. Information and communication  
Information is needed at all stages in the ERM process. Communication ensures the acquisition of new 
and relevant data (Gray & Balmer 1998). 
8. Monitoring  
The ERM process must be monitored to keep track of progress, and to measure performance against the 
specified criteria so that changes can be made if and where necessary. 
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Figure 1-3: The enterprise risk management process 
1.1 Limitations of Enterprise Risk Management 
Enterprise risk management does not make decisions for the business. However, ERM can aid in 
decision-making by providing insights into possible outcomes of certain paths that may be taken.  
In this regard, risk assessments should attempt to identify all significant risk although it is limited by the 
resources allocated, information available and time constraints.  
The use of any risk management strategy does not guarantee the absence of all risk. It is possible to 
predict and summarily plan for a variety of risks. Even so, the possibility of a risk event is always 
present but effective risk controls reduce the impact of risks. As such, people make mistakes, it is part of 
being human, thus even when a particular risk is planned for, and it does not guarantee that accidents 
will not happen. 
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1.2  Rationale  
Steinberg et al. and ISO 31 000 introduce risk management frameworks, and the steps required in an 
effective risk management process (Steinberg et al. 2004; ISO 31000:2009, Risk Management—
Principles and Guidelines 2009). These steps are generic and act as a guideline for managing risks. 
While useful, these frameworks do not provide a detailed analysis of the available methods that can be 
used to complete each step. 
Previous research has focussed extensively on qualitative analysis of risk (Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008). 
Qualitative risk management involves using intuitive knowledge and experience to assess and respond to 
risks. In many cases, intuitive knowledge and experience may be sufficient to complete the risk 
management process but as the risks become more complex, using intuition may not always be an 
effective strategy (Wang, Dulaimi & Aguria 2004). 
In contrast, quantitative risk management techniques rely on data, probabilistic modelling and statistical 
analysis. Ideally, a risk management process should be predominantly quantitative but as stated 
previously, risk is inherently subjective, hence giving qualitative techniques merits in the risk 
management process.  
There are very few studies presenting an integrated risk management approach accompanied by detailed 
analysis of the tools and techniques available. Although there are studies that present the quantitative 
analysis of risk, limited studies exist that present how risk response and risk analysis are linked 
quantitatively (Dey 2010). 
Moreover, a purely quantitative approach requires a considerable allocation of time and resources which 
may not be practical. Risk is generally assessed subjectively because statistical data is rarely available 
(INCOSE 2007). This study will show that quantitative analysis is possible even when data are sparsely 
available. 
1.3  Research Problem  
Qualitative analysis of risk can be done quickly and with minimal effort. However, this approach relies 
on intuition and experience which, is sufficient for non-critical risks that are well understood. Critical 
risks that are not well understood require further analysis. Quantitative analysis provides an in-depth 
analysis of the risks. However, a predominantly quantitative approach can become overly complex and 
requires significant time and resources, thus it may not always be practical.  
Owing to this, the research problem is that there is no systematic, enterprise risk management 
framework that includes an in-depth presentation of qualitative risk analysis methods for risks that are 
non-critical and quantitative methods for critical risks. Any effective ERM framework must be practical. 
This means that an enterprise must be able to use the methodology with existing personnel, skills and 
knowledge. The process must follow a structured, sequential and logical format. Moreover, an ERM 
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framework should establish to what extent is risk management understood in an enterprise, the 
perception of risk management within the company and determine how the enterprise characteristics 
affect the risk management processes.   
1.4 Research Goal and Objectives 
1.4.1 Research Goal 
From the research problem it was proposed that, a systematic enterprise-wide risk management 
framework that incorporates quantitative as well as qualitative techniques such that an in-depth analysis 
is provided when the risks are critical and simpler experience and intuition based analysis when the risks 
are non-critical. 
Thus, the main goal of this research is to develop an enterprise risk management framework that 
incorporates both qualitative and quantitative risk management techniques in a practical and systematic 
manner.  
1.4.2 Research Objectives 
In order to achieve the stated research goal, this study will seek to meet the following objectives: 
 Define the steps of the enterprise risk management process  
 Identify qualitative and quantitative risk management techniques 
 Formulate and test the framework in a case study 
 To show that risk management does not have to be overly simple to be implemented, or overly 
complex to be performed effectively. 
1.5 Research Design and Methodology  
1.5.1 Research Design 
Research Design can be classified into 3 main categories, namely non-empirical, empirical and mixed 
method research design. Non-empirical research involves analysing characteristics of a system that 
cannot be defined numerically. In contrast, empirical research is used when the system can be defined 
numerically. Mixed methods research is the use of both empirical and non-empirical analysis to form 
conclusions (Leedy & Ormrod 2013). 
This study employed both empirical and non-empirical methods. As stated in section 1.1.3, it is 
impossible to completely model the risk management process empirically because uncertainty is rooted 
in human behaviour and perceptions which are inherently non-empirical by most standards. 
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1.5.2 Research Methods 
The following research methods were used when carrying out the study: 
 Comprehensive Literature Review 
A comprehensive review of literature on existing risk management processes was done to establish the 
steps required in a risk management process. The review of literature provided useful insights into the 
available methods for completing each step. Once the process and methods were understood, the scope 
of the study was defined, and the most appropriate risk management methods were chosen.  
 Case Study and data processing 
Historical data in the form of a list of risks was obtained from the company in the case study (See 
Appendix B). Following this, questionnaires were given to key personnel at the company (Appendix A).  
 Data processing  
The data was processed using statistical analysis, Monte Carlo simulation and analytical hierarchy 
processes among others.  
 Conclusions 
The proposed framework is validated through a discussion on its practicality and logical format. 
1.6  Thesis Outline 
Chapter 1: Introduction - provides background information on enterprise risk management and presents 
the proposed research.  
Chapter 2: Presents the methods to measure the effect the internal environment on enterprise risk 
management.  
Chapter 3: Presents risk identification procedures using working group and interview techniques. 
Chapter 4: Establishes qualitative and quantitative techniques for risk assessment 
Chapter 5: Describes the procedure for selecting a risk response strategy qualitatively and 
quantitatively. 
Chapter 6: Provides a brief description of case study and confidentiality limitations and presents the 
analysis of results from each risk management step.  
Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations - summarises the main findings of the research and 
establishes whether the research goal has been achieved.  
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1.7 Scope 
In this section, the boundaries of the research will be clearly defined. The ERM process consists of a 
number of well-defined steps. Although interrelated, each step is a separable and unique part of the 
process that can be discussed conceptually. This study has been limited to the exploration of the 
following steps: 
 Internal Environment 
 Risk Identification 
 Risk Assessment 
 Risk Response Type 
Control strategies are excluded from the discussion as this is a highly specific research area. Control 
strategies depend on the type of industry, company policies, environment, management preferences and 
most importantly, the identified risk. The variation is too radical to formulate standardised risk control 
strategies. Even when companies face similar risks, the control strategies may differ for various reasons. 
Communication and Monitoring are important parts of ERM but these too are excluded from this 
discussion because extensive research has been done in developing effective methods of communication 
and monitoring (Steinberg et al. 2004).  
Implementation of risk management plans into the business policies is separable from the risk 
management process itself and is not required in order to complete a risk management process. Thus it is 
excluded from this study. Moreover, the efficacy of implementation cannot be measured within the time 
constraints of this study. 
The success or failure of a specific objective is usually measured over a number of years. Since the 
effectiveness of using a given objective setting technique is related to the success or failure of 
objectives, performance of an objective setting technique cannot be measured within the time constraints 
of this study.  
It was stated that risk can have a positive or negative result. Risk opportunities have positive results and 
risk threats have negative results. This thesis will be limited to the study of risk threats as data is readily 
available for this type of risk. The methodology can be extended to risk opportunities in future studies. 
The loss associated with risks will be measured using monetary values only. While schedule losses and 
other losses such reputation impact can be measured, the most frequently utilised and recorded loss is 
associated with monetary values.  
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Figure 1-4: Scope of the study 
1.8 Summary 
Risk and risk management was defined in this chapter. The enterprise risk management processes that 
were presented will serve as guideline to develop the methods required to complete a risk management 
process. Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will present these methods in logical and 
systematic sequence. Considering that there is no complete substitution for the experience and expertise 
of individuals, the proposed framework will include both qualitative and quantitative techniques. 
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CHAPTER 2 INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 introduced the enterprise risk management processes, defined the scope of the research and 
presented the research. This chapter presents the first step in the ERM process, which is evaluating the 
internal environment of an enterprise.  
2.2  Evaluating Internal Environment 
The effect of the internal environment can be seen in the findings of the Columbia Space Shuttle 
Accident Investigation board report. The report states: 
“…Cultural traits and organisational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, 
including: reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices.” (Steinberg et al. 
2004). 
It is the case that internal environment influences how effectively risk is identified and determines 
management’s philosophy for handling risk. Therefore, assessing the internal environment can provide 
insight into the level of risk management deployment and how well employees understand the risk 
management processes (Cravens, Oliver & Ramamoorti 2003).  
Moreover, evaluating the internal environment can be used to identify subjects relating to ethics and 
values within the enterprise which need improvement.  
2.2.1 Factors Affecting the Internal Environment 
Several factors have been shown to be vital in the implementation of ERM (Beasley, Clune & 
Hermanson 2005). Collectively, these results demonstrate that it is the attitude within senior 
management which ultimately determines the extent of ERM implementation and level of commitment 
to risk management.  
2.2.1.1 Risk Appetite   
The risk appetite refers to the level of risk the enterprise is willing to accept in order to achieve its 
objectives (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008). The risk appetite can be seen as a reflection of risk 
management philosophy. Sometimes an enterprise may be willing to take unethical risks to achieve 
objectives such as acts of dishonestly, placing employees in unsafe conditions without consideration of 
the risks involved and falsifying reports (Steinberg et al. 2004). In order to avoid such instances of 
unethical behaviour, good corporate culture should be established that removes or at least reduces the 
willingness to engage in these types of behaviour (See section 2.2.1.2). 
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2.2.1.2 Integrity and Ethical Values 
Ethical beliefs and norms can vary widely across an enterprise. It is the duty of management to ensure 
that good standards for ethical behaviour are in place, that employees understand them and that these 
standards are enforced within the enterprise (ISO 31000:2009, Risk Management—Principles and 
Guidelines 2009). 
In this regard, formal codes of conduct are encouraged as they provide a foundation upon which good 
corporate culture and ethical values can be built. Employees should receive such documentation and 
understand it. Formal codes of conduct provide benchmarks against which values such as integrity, 
honesty and professional conduct can be measured (Cravens & Oliver 2006). 
In the same vein, management should demonstrate its commitment to good corporate culture by always 
striving to act ethically and with integrity as employees are likely to embody these same values 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2011). 
The way in which management is perceived by the employees of an enterprise is an indication of the 
corporate culture. Analysing this perception and reporting any issues that arise is a useful technique to 
gain an understanding of corporate culture. 
Since risk management relies on honesty and integrity, withholding or providing false information 
reduces the effectiveness of the process. Thus, the effectiveness of ERM cannot be fully realised if 
integrity and honesty is lacking among people who create, delegate and monitor the day-to-day 
operations within an enterprise (Steinberg et al. 2004).  
2.2.1.3 Commitment to Competence 
Competence is a representation of the knowledge and skills needed to complete allocated tasks. A trade-
off will exist between competence levels and cost. Management will, as a result, decide how well the 
task needs to be done versus the cost (Steinberg et al. 2004). 
2.2.1.4 Assignment of Authority and Responsibility 
Accountability in ERM refers to ownership and control of risks. The accountability for risk controls 
should be with management and other designated employees given the authority to address risk 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2011).  
Risk owners should be adequately skilled so as to handle their responsibility. The risk owners should 
also be provided with the necessary resources to control, monitor and report on risks to all stakeholders 
(Steinberg et al. 2004). 
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2.2.2 ISO 31 000 Principles for Effective Risk Management 
The eleven principles of risk management as described by ISO 31 000, provide a basis for developing 
the questionnaire relating to the level of understanding and implementation of risk management in the 
company (ISO 31000:2009, Risk Management—Principles and Guidelines 2009). This questionnaire 
can be seen in Appendix A 
1. Risk management creates and protects value. 
A challenge that every risk manager faces is to show that risk management adds value to the enterprise. 
Inclusion of this principle ensures that there is a formal requirement for the risk management to create 
value. The benefits of risk management include increasing the likelihood of achieving objectives, 
minimising losses, and making an environment a better place to work in. 
2. Risk Management is viewed as part of the enterprise management processes.  
This principle implies that risk management processes should be part of the main activities and 
procedures of the enterprise. 
3. All decision making within the enterprise involves the consideration of risks and subsequent 
application of risk management to the appropriate degree. 
Risk is a pervasive part of any decision (Al-Bahar & Krandall 1990). By implementing risk management 
as part of every major strategic and operational decision, the enterprise ensures that the risks involved 
are wholly understood. 
4. Risk management explicitly addresses uncertainty  
Identifying and analysing a wide range of risks allows management to better implement controls so as to 
reduce the likelihood and/or impact of the risk, thereby creating an enterprise that is more resilient to 
risks. 
5.  Risk Management should be systematic, structured and timely 
Planning and control of risk management processes is required to achieve consistent and reliable results. 
Structured, systematic risk management that is scheduled regularly ensures this process is made simpler. 
6. Risk management is based on the best information available. 
Information is often limited and imperfect. However, good risk management practice should include 
information from all possible sources including, but not limited to, observation, experience, expert 
opinion and historical data. 
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7. Risk management is personalised to the needs of the enterprise. 
Every enterprise is unique. While enterprises may face risks that are similar, risk management processes 
should be adapted according the enterprise objectives, risk appetite, stakeholder requirements and 
internal environment. 
8. Risk management should take human and cultural factors into account 
Management should take into account the cultural attributes of its employees, more specifically, their 
skills and capabilities. The internal environment determines the cultural factors that must be accounted 
for.  
9. Risk management should be transparent 
This principle recognises the need for the risk management processes and the results thereof to be 
accessible to all internal and external stakeholders. Stakeholders should be included in the process at all 
times.  
10. Risk management should be dynamic and responsive to change 
When new information becomes available or the internal/external environment changes, the risk 
management plan needs to change and adapt accordingly. 
11. Risk management facilitates continual improvement 
This principle builds on the fact that risk management should be responsive to change. It encourages 
management to continuously improve the enterprise through the application of risk management. 
2.2.3 Key Attributes used to Describe the Internal Environment 
The level of risk management understanding, risk appetite, authority, competence and integrity within an 
enterprise affect the risk management process and thus should be analysed. The state of the following 
key attributes should be established in order to evaluate the internal environment (Steinberg et al. 2004): 
 Leadership and Strategy 
 People and Communication 
 Accountability and Reinforcement 
 Risk Management and Infrastructure 
Appendix A provides the questionnaire that was used in this study to establish the attributes of the 
internal environment within an enterprise.  
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CHAPTER 3 RISK IDENTIFICATION 
3.1  Introduction  
The previous chapter introduced the state of the internal environment as a factor in the risk management 
process. The current chapter will describe the nature of risk identification and its importance in the risk 
management process as well as present various techniques for identifying risk.  
3.2  The Importance and Nature of Risk Identification 
It is universally recognised that risk identification and assessment are the most vital steps in the risk 
management process (Chapman & Ward 2003). In this study, the risk identification process will include 
the identification and classification of risks. The identification of risks should be as thorough as possible 
since risks that are not identified will not undergo scrutiny in the assessment stage (Al-Bahar & Krandall 
1990). 
Since the identification of risk is predominantly subjective and wholly qualitative, the methods through 
which risks are identified are central to the success of the whole process. However, before selecting an 
identification technique, it is crucial to understand the available techniques.  
Risk identification is often done through working group techniques and interviews. Working group 
techniques include the Delphi method, brainstorming and nominal group techniques. 
3.2.1 Working Group Techniques 
Working groups are collective groups of individuals who are familiar with the topic that is to be 
discussed. When the topic is risk management, the working group should consist of risk management 
experts within the enterprise. The purpose of the working group in risk identification is to produce a 
comprehensive list of risks.  
Three working group techniques are presented in this study: 
 Brainstorming 
 Nominal Group Technique 
 Delphi Method 
While brainstorming is the most frequently used working group technique, several other working group 
techniques are available. 
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3.2.1.1 Identification Methods for Working Group Techniques 
(i) Delphi Technique  
The Delphi technique is a method for systematic collection of data from isolated and anonymous 
respondents using a questionnaire. The core of the Delphi technique is the elimination of direct social 
contact when answering the questions (Chapman 1998). 
Supplementary information may be provided to participants to assist in answering the questions. In 
terms of risk identification, the participants can be supplied with a process diagram or a trigger list to 
help in the risk identification process (See Appendix C). 
(ii) Brainstorming Technique 
Creativity in risk identification is of utmost importance as it yields a wide range of risks and critical 
thinking. In order to promote creativity in brainstorming sessions, the following four rules must be 
strictly adhered (Chapman 1998):  
 Criticism is not allowed during the idea formulation process. Evaluation of ideas that emerge 
from brainstorming is done at a later stage. 
 Participants are encouraged to think creatively.  
 The greater the number of ideas presented, the better the process becomes. 
 Combination and improvement is encouraged where participants build on each other’s ideas. 
The participant would typically be supplied with process analysis tools and/ or trigger list as 
supplementary material (See Appendix C for examples).  
(iii)Nominal Group Technique  
The Nominal Group Technique starts with the participants writing down their ideas on paper. After a 
predetermined length of time, a participant is allowed to share one idea with the group. The idea 
presented by the participant is then recorded on a chart in full view of all members. Once the recording 
is done, a different participant presents an idea. This process is repeated until each participant has 
presented all their ideas (Chapman 1998). The method is called round-robin listing.  
Once all the ideas have been listed, each idea is discussed and the most relevant ideas are identified. The 
Nominal Group Technique procedure is listed below: 
 Silent listing of ideas 
 Round-robin listing of ideas 
 Discussion of each idea 
 Individual voting on the priority of risk 
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3.2.2 Interview Techniques 
Expert interviews are the acquisition of judgements regarding a particular field of study through one-on-
one discussions with subject matter experts. Experience and adequate interviewing skills are required to 
elicit the required data. 
An interview can take between 45-75 minutes (Keizer & Vos 2003). Thus, it may not be feasible to 
conduct individual interviews when the number of participants in the study is large but instead a 
combination of working group techniques and individual interviews can be used. Other typical problems 
associated with expert interviews are identifying the wrong participant, obtaining irrelevant data, 
unwillingness of the expert to co-operate and personal biases (Keizer & Halman 2009).  
The factors affecting expert interviews and the procedure to conduct an effective interview will be 
discussed in this section. The underlying assumption in the discussion is that correct participants have 
been chosen and that they are willing to co-operate.  
3.2.2.1 Prior to Interview 
Prior to the interviews, the participants in the risk management study are asked to perform the following 
tasks: 
 An initial kick-off meeting to inform participants that the objective of the interview process is to 
develop comprehensive list of risks (Keizer, Halman & Song 2002). 
 The participants should be asked to prepare themselves by thinking about the processes that 
involve risk. 
3.2.2.2 Biases affecting the Interview Process 
Since it was assumed that the correct experts have been chosen, and that they are co-operative, this study 
has been limited to discussing personal bias within an expert interview. Apart from selecting the most 
appropriate participants for the interviews, two sources of bias can be observed in an interview process, 
these are motivational and cognitive bias (Spetzler & Holstein 1975). 
(i) Motivational Bias 
Motivational biases are cognisant or incognisant modifications of the participant’s opinion for personal 
gain. For example, the participant may want to highlight a specific risk by providing non-representative 
information about the risk. 
The participant may also want to bias their response because he/she believes their performance within 
the enterprise will be evaluated based on the outcome of the interview. 
The participant may also deliberately refrain from considering the risks because they consider the events 
improbable.  
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(ii) Cognitive Bias 
Cognitive biases are is the modification of the participant’s opinion based on the manner in which the 
participant mentally processes information. For example, a participant may be biased towards providing 
information simply because that information is the first thing that comes to mind. Five types of cognitive 
bias exist (Spetzler & Holstein 1975): 
 Availability 
 Adjustment and Anchoring 
 Representativeness 
 Unstated Assumptions 
 Coherence 
3.2.2.3 The Interview Process 
According to Keizer & Vos, all interviews should follow a standard procedure (Keizer & Vos 2003): 
 A short introduction of the interviewer and interviewee. The interviewer then clarifies any 
uncertainty regarding the objective of the interview. Possible motivational biases are explored. 
(See Appendix E) 
 Structuring - the structure of the interview process is communicated to the subject.  
 Opening questions - the interviewee is asked to provide clarification of their position within the 
enterprise and tasks that they are responsible for. Cognitive biases are explored. (Appendix E) 
 The participant is then asked to identify possible sources of risk based on a systematic 
description of all their task responsibilities 
 Verification of results 
3.2.3 Classification of Risks 
After the risks have been identified using a particular method, they are classified. Risk classification 
provides insight into how the risk affects the enterprise. Several sources provide comprehensive 
categories under which a myriad of risks can be classified (Dorofee et al. 1996; Mustafa & Al-Bahar 
1991; Beasley, Clune & Hermanson 2005). Figure 3-1 shows the classification structure that was used in 
this study. 
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Figure 3-1: Risk Classification Scheme adapted from (Mustafa & Al-Bahar 1991) 
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CHAPTER 4 RISK ASSESSMENT 
4.1  Introduction 
Chapter 3 presented the procedure to identify risks. These risks are then assessed according to the 
methodology in the current chapter. Risk assessment methods presented here will include both 
qualitative and quantitative methods. 
The proposed assessment framework includes risk prioritisation, risk criticality designation and impact 
and likelihood estimation.  
4.1.1 Prioritisation of Risks  
Multi Criteria decision analysis (MCDA) offers a method to structure and analyse complex decision 
making problems (Azari et al. 2011). The MCDA problem can consist of multiple criteria to achieve a 
goal and many alternatives which satisfy criteria (See Figure 4-1). MDCA will be used in this study to 
obtain a ranked list of risks. 
4.1.1.1 Prioritisation of Risks using the Analytical Hierarchy Process 
Non-critical risks that have clear, easily implemented solutions should be assessed quickly (Dorofee et 
al. 1996). Prioritisation of risks enables the enterprise to focus on the more important risks first and 
reduce over-management of insignificant risks.  
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is an effective MCDA tool for handling complex decisions. 
The AHP is presented in this section as tool to create a ranked list of risks (Saaty 1987). 
4.1.1.2 The Analytical Hierarchy Process 
(i) Step 1: Structure the Decision Making Problem as a Hierarchy. 
The hierarchy starts with the goal at the top level. Following this the criteria are listed. In the third tier, 
the alternatives are listed. Figure 4-1 illustrates a 3-tier Analytical hierarchy process. While more tiers 
and sub-criteria can be added to the hierarchy, the method that will be used for risk analysis in this study 
will only require 3 levels.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
21 
Chapter 4 | Risk Assessment 
 
Figure 4-1: A 3-Tier AHP Hierarchy Structure 
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 and       
 
   ⁄   
Alternative 
1
Alternative 
2
Alternative 
1
Alternative 
2
Alternative 
1
Alternative 
2
Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3
GoalTier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3
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The relative importance among elements is measured according to a numerical scale (see Table 4-1). In 
this scale, it is assumed that the     element is equally or more important than the     element (Saaty 
1990). 
Table 4-1: Description of Pairwise Comparison Scoring Scheme 
Weight Value 
(aij) 
Definition Explanation 
1 Equal Importance Two risk have same impact 
3 Slight Importance One risk is slightly more important than another 
5 More important One risk is more important than another 
7 Strong importance Experience and judgement strongly favour one risk over another 
9 Absolutely important Highest possible order of importance of one risk over another 
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate values Represents compromise between the priorities listed above 
Reciprocals of 
above 
If activity   has one of the above weights assigned when compared to  , then element   has the 
reciprocal when compared to element   
 
Finally, the pairwise comparison matrix   for   elements is formed: 
   {  
          
          
    
          
  } 
(iv) Step 4: Normalisation 
The matrix   is then normalised. This is done first by summing the entries in each column. Each entry 
    is then divided by the sum of column  . This results in a new matrix called      , the normalised 
matrix of pairwise comparisons: 
 
      
(
 
 
  
   
∑    
 
   
 
   
∑    
 
   
   
   
∑    
 
   
 
   
∑    
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Where  
∑    
 
   
                                     
 ̅   
   
∑    
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(v) Step 5: Priority Weight Vector 
The priority vector (eigenvector) is a column vector,   in which the entries    represent the relative 
importance of elements that were evaluated. The largest entry in the eigenvector   is the most important 
element and the smallest is the least important. The entries    of vector   are developed by taking the 
average of each row in        according to: 
    
∑  ̅  
 
   
 
                   
Where: 
 ̅   
   
∑    
 
   
 
                                      
 
Then the Matrix   becomes: 
   
{
 
 
 
 
  
   
∑    
 
   
 
   
∑    
 
   
    
   
∑    
 
   
 
 
   
∑    
 
   
 
   
∑    
 
   
    
   
∑    
 
   
 
  
}
 
 
 
 
 {  
  
 
  
  }  
Steps 1 to 4 are completed for criteria with respect to the goal and for alternatives with respect to each 
criterion, thus several priority vectors will exist. The next step in the AHP is to check for consistency of 
the priority vectors. 
(vi) Step 6: Checking for Consistency 
When the number of comparisons to be made is numerous, inconsistencies may arise (Lamata & Pelaez 
2002). Inconsistencies arise when an incorrect comparison is made. Saaty’s eigenvector method will be 
used to evaluate the consistency of the priority vectors (Saaty & Vargas 1984). 
The Eigen vector method is a two part process. 
(a) Part 1: The Consistency Index 
The consistency index, CI is a measure of the degree of consistency among the pairwise comparisons. 
The procedure to calculate CI is shown below: 
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In this equation   is the number of comparisons to be made and      is a Eigen value scalar. The closer 
      is to    the more consistent is the result. 
The maximum Eigen value (      is calculated using the row average technique  (Alexander 2012) as 
follows:  
First, the original non-normalised comparison matrix   is multiplied by its respective priority vector   
to yield a new matrix  : 
      
   {  
          
          
    
          
  }    {  
  
 
  
  }   {  
  
 
  
  } 
Next each entry    in matrix   is divided by the corresponding entry    in matrix    
{ 
  
 
  
 }                               { 
  
 
  
 } 
   { 
     
 
     
 } 
This will yield a final matrix . The average of the entries,    in the matrix   is the maximum Eigen 
value. 
       
          
 
 
Ideally,         . However, perfect consistency is difficult to achieve when the number of 
comparisons is large.  
(b) Part 2: Consistency Ratio (CR) 
The consistency ratio is a measure of the total inconsistency in the judgements. A large consistency ratio 
indicates that the comparisons are inconsistent. As the consistency ratio decreases, the comparisons 
become more consistent (Saaty 1987). The consistency ratio is calculated as follows: 
   
  
  
  
where CI is the consistency index calculated in Part 1 and RI is the random index. RI is the average CI 
value of randomly generated comparison matrices. The values for RI are shown in Table 4-2 (Saaty 
1987). 
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Table 4-2: Random Index values for n comparisons 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
RI 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.90 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 1.51 1.48 1.56 1.57 1.59 
 
A consistency ratio below 10% indicates that the priority vector   is a reliable indication of the order of 
importance of elements (Saaty & Vargas 1984) . 
Thus for, 
  
  
     
the inconsistency in the pairwise comparisons is small enough to ensure that judgements are reliable. If 
the consistency ratio exceeds 10%, it may be necessary to revise the pairwise comparisons and ascertain 
the source of inconsistency. 
(c) Part 3: Improving the Consistency Ratio 
If a comparison matrix   is consistent, then       . However, in practice, the matrix   is rarely 
consistent (Zeshui & Cuiping 1999). Thus, for         , the inconsistency is unacceptable.  
A practical method for revising judgements is as follows: 
First, calculate the absolute value difference: 
|          | 
Where  
                                   
                           
                                    
The comparisons which have the largest absolute difference are then revised. Once the consistency for 
all priority vectors has been established, the global priority is determined.  
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(vii) Step 7: Calculate Global Priority 
When step 6 has been completed, the decision-maker should have the following priority vectors: 
 A priority vector which describes the order of importance among the criteria. 
 Several priority vectors which describe the order of importance of alternatives with respect to a 
specific criterion. 
The first step in determining the global priority is the formation of a matrix  . Matrix   is the combined 
priority eigenvectors for alternatives. Each entry     in matrix S represents the priority of an alternative   
against a particular criterion  : 
   {
       
   
       
} 
 
Therefore, the first column in   will represent the priority of alternatives with respect to the first 
criterion and the second column will represent the priority of alternatives with respect to the second 
criterion and so forth.  
Next, matrix multiplication of the criteria priority eigenvector           with the derived alternatives 
matrix   will yield the final global priority : 
 
              
   {
       
   
       
}  { 
  
 
  
 }   { 
  
 
  
 } 
 
(viii) Step 8: Sensitivity analysis 
The final step in the AHP technique is a sensitivity analysis in which the global priority vector   is 
checked for sensitivity to changes in the criteria priority weight. 
The procedure for performing a sensitivity analysis is as follows:  
 Alter the entries    in Matrix           
 Perform step 7 again 
 Take note of any significant changes in the final priority matrix  
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Figure 4-2: Procedure for the prioritisation of risks 
 
4.1.1.3 Analytical Hierarchy Process Assumptions 
AHP is based on the following assumptions (Saaty 2008): 
 Pairwise comparisons can be made between each of the elements in the hierarchy. Differences in 
the importance of criteria must be evaluated on ratio scale. 
 For each criterion, pairwise comparisons must be made between each of the alternatives. The 
difference in importance of the alternative is evaluated on a ratio scale. 
 The alternatives comparisons and criteria comparisons are performed using common scales. 
 The criteria are mutually independent (criteria do not affect one another in terms of the assigned 
difference) 
 The alternatives are mutually independent (alternatives do not affect one another in terms of the 
assigned difference).  
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4.1.1.4 Analytical Hierarchy Process Limitations 
Like all modelling techniques, AHP has limitations. Firstly, AHP is based on the assumption that all 
matrices have the same mathematical form. This is known as a positive reciprocal matrix. A positive 
reciprocal matrix implies that if the decision maker uses the number 9 to describe that element   is more 
important than  , then 1/9 must be used to describe the importance of element   with respect to  .  
Another concern is the lack of interaction between elements. The elements within the AHP matrix are 
mutually independent. This implies that the assigned values in the comparison matrix do not influence 
one another. 
The third concern is the grouping of individual preferences. Two situations can arise, the first of which 
is a situation where the preference of every participant is weighted equally and thus each opinion in the 
AHP equally affects the final risk ranking. The second situation is when the preference of each 
participant has a different weighting. In this case, certain individual preferences will have a larger effect 
on the final risk ranking. The data will be gathered anonymously from the company (See section 6.2), 
thus grouping of individual opinions cannot be performed in this study. 
The fourth concern is the time it takes to perform the AHP. Dorofee et al. give the following table when 
evaluating risks against one criterion: 
Table 4-3: Time Required for AHP comparisons redrawn from (Dorofee et al. 1996) 
Number 
of risks 
Comparisons Required 
(1 criterion) 
Average 
Time(min) 
Comparisons 
(3 Criteria)  
Time(min) 
5 10 15 30 25 
10 45 30 135 120 
15 105 60 315 180+ 
 
When the number of criteria increases, the number of comparisons may increase significantly. The 
number of risks to be ranked should be kept to a maximum of 20 for one criterion or a maximum of 200 
comparisons when dealing with multiple criteria (Dorofee et al. 1996). 
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4.1.2 Identifying Critical Risks using the Risk Diagnosing Methodology 
In the previous section, the procedure for the prioritisation of risks using AHP risks was discussed. 
However, prioritisation only lists the risks in order of importance. A technique is required to determine 
at which point risks can be diagnosed as critical or non-critical.  
Once the criticality of risks is known, qualitative risk assessment can be performed on non-critical risks 
and quantitative assessment on more critical risks. In this study, the Risk Diagnosing Methodology 
(RDM) will be used to identify critical risks. 
The ability to diagnose the criticality of risks is crucial in high-risk, time constrained situations (Keizer, 
Halman & Song 2002). The RDM was developed to identify and diagnose business risk within the 
product innovation sphere. In this study, the RDM methodology was adapted for use within the ERM 
field. RDM consists of nine steps which are divided into three distinct sections as shown here, in Figure 
4-3: 
 
Figure 4-3: Risk Diagnosing Methodology adapted from (Keizer, Halman & Song 2002) 
 
In this study, RDM will only be used to determine the risk criticality. For this reason, only the Risk 
Diagnosis section of this methodology is developed further.  
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4.1.2.1 The Truncated Risk Diagnosing Methodology 
Starting with step 4 in Figure 4-3, the RDM can be completed as follows:  
(i) Step 4: Developing the Risk Questionnaire 
RDM in its current form was formulated for new product development. In order to adapt the process for 
enterprise risk management, changes to step 4 were made. The risks examined in this study will 
typically be risks that have previously occurred. In new product development, the risks are unknown.  
When unknown risks are being identified and subsequently diagnosed, the plausibility of the risk 
statement is evaluated. This type of evaluation is not required for the risks in this study. Instead of 
evaluating the plausibility, the participants were asked to rate the likelihood of occurrence. The rest of 
concepts in the RDM are applicable to the risks evaluated in this study. 
(ii) Step 5: Answering the Risk Questionnaire 
The questions used to diagnose risks are: 
 How often does the risks occur? 
 Assuming the risks occur, to what extent is the enterprise able to mitigate the risk? 
 How severely does the risk affect the ability of the enterprise to complete objectives? 
The participants provide a score for each of the questions with respect to each risk. The details of the 
scoring system are shown in Table 4-4.  
Table 4-4: Description of weight scoring scheme for RDM questions (Keizer, Halman & Song 
2002) 
Weight How often does 
the risk occur? 
The enterprise’s ability to Influence Impact on objectives 
1 Rare Abundance of mitigation options, easily 
implemented at low cost 
minimal, almost nothing  
2 Unlikely Mitigation measures exist, easily 
implemented 
Impact noted, but not concerning 
3 Possible Mitigation measures exist, feasible 
implementation possible. 
Objectives can still be achieved 
with risk controls  
4 Likely Some options exist, difficult or 
unfeasible to implement 
Significant impact, intervention 
required 
5 Almost Certain Little or nothing can be done Severe impact, failure of 
objectives 
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Once the rating system is understood by all participants, the questionnaire can be completed. The RDM 
questionnaire can be seen in Figure A-1. The scores are then used to build a profile of the risks. Using 
the risk profile, the critical risks can be identified (Keizer, Halman & Song 2002). 
(iii)Step 6: Constructing the Risk Profile 
Determining the risk criticality is a two part process, and can be obtained by following these procedures 
(Keizer, Halman & Song 2002): 
(a) Part 1: Assigning the Question Classes 
The cumulative percentage of responses to each question is calculated. For a particular risk, each 
question is classified into one of four groups based on the cumulative percentages. The rules for 
classification are as follows: 
 
 (―*‖) at least 50% of the scores are at 4 or 5 and there are no scores of 1 
 (―0‖) at least 50% of the scores are at 1 or 2 and there are no scores of 5 
 (―m‖) at least 50% of the scores are at 3 and there are no scores of 1 or 5 
 (―?‖) For all remaining cases, a lack of consensus exists (wide distribution of opinions). Here, a 
discussion may be used to provide more clarity of the risk and the scores of certain individuals 
may be changed. 
 
The point at which the responses reach a cumulative percentage of 50% is of importance because it 
gives an indication of how the majority of participants perceive the risk. The criterion of majority 
perception can be chosen differently depending on the needs of the enterprise (Keizer, Halman & Song 
2002) but for purpose of this study, the criterion will be chosen as 50%. 
The distribution of opinions is also important. If opinions vary widely with regards to a certain risk, 
further investigation may be required to determine the cause of the distribution.  
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(b) Part 2: Designation of the Risk Category 
Designation of the risk category is based on the question classes for each risk. For example, a risk 
statement where each question is marked with ―*‖ leading to the combination ―* * *‖ would be a fatal 
risk (designated by  ), whereas risks with the ―0 0 0‖ combination would indicate a safe risk (designated 
by  ). Five base categories exist, these are: 
   = safe: little or no corrective action is required 
   = low: corrective action can be performed depending on the risk appetite of the enterprise. If 
action is taken, assessment can be limited to qualitative techniques. 
   = medium: corrective action is required but the management can decide whether qualitative is 
sufficient or quantitative assessment is preferential. 
   = High: Corrective action is required and rigorous quantitative techniques are needed to fully 
understand the threat level and response strategy. 
   = Fatal: Corrective action is required and rigorous quantitative techniques are needed to fully 
understand the threat level and response strategy. If fatal risks occur, the objectives of the 
enterprise will be severely impacted or may fail completely. 
When a lack of consensus exists, the risk category can be represented by a range such as low to medium 
(L–M) or medium to high (M–H) (Keizer & Halman 2009). 
According to Keizer, Halman & Song, there are 64 possible combinations of risk scores. See Table 4-5 
for a list of all possible combinations. (Keizer, Halman & Song 2002) 
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Table 4-5: RDM Risk Classes redrawn from (Keizer, Halman & Song 2002) 
Score:               
* = At least 50% of the scores are at 4 or 5 and there are no scores of 1 
0 = at least 50% of the scores are at 1 or 2 and there are no scores of 5 
M = at least 50% of the scores are at 3 and there are no scores of 1 or 5 
? = For all the remaining cases (wide distribution in opinions or significantly deviating 
opinions). 
SCORE 
R
IS
K
 
C
A
T
E
G
O
R
Y
 SCORE 
R
IS
K
 
C
A
T
E
G
O
R
Y
 
How often 
does the 
risk 
occur? 
Ability to 
reduce 
number of 
occurrences  
Relative 
Importance 
to objectives 
How often 
does the 
risk 
occur? 
Ability to 
reduce 
number of 
occurrences 
Relative 
Importance 
to objectives 
* * * F * * ? M-F 
* * 0 L * ? * H-F 
* 0 * M ? * * M-F 
0 * * H * ? ? L-F 
0 0 * L ? * ? L-F 
0 * 0 L ? ? * L-F 
* 0 0 L ? ? ? S-F 
0 0 0 S ? 0 0 L 
* * m H 0 ? 0 L 
* m * H 0 0 ? L 
m * * H ? ? 0 S-M 
* m m M ? 0 ? S-H 
m * m M 0 ? ? S-M 
m m * M * ? 0 L-M 
m m m M * 0 ? L-H 
0 * m M 0 * ? L-M 
* 0 m M 0 ? * L-M 
0 m * M ? 0 * L-H 
* m 0 M ? * 0 L-M 
m * 0 M * ? m M-H 
m 0 * M * m ? M-H 
0 0 m L m ? * M-H 
0 m 0 L m * ? M-H 
m 0 0 L ? m * M-H 
0 m m M ? * m M-H 
m m 0 M m ? 0 L-M 
m 0 m M m 0 ? L-M 
        0 ? m L-M 
        0 m ? L-M 
        ? 0 m L-M 
        ? m 0 L-M 
        ? m m L-M 
        m ? m M 
        m m ? M 
        ? ? m L-H 
        ? m ? L-H 
        m ? ? L-H 
Description of risk classification: 
F = Fatal risk; A combination of classes indicates lack of consensus. 
Narrow distributions may be tolerable. Wide 
distributions should be discussed further to resolve 
disagreement. If consensus cannot be achieved, assume 
the worst case. 
H = High risk; 
M = Medium risk; 
L = Low risk; 
S = Safe, no risk. 
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The completed risk profile is shown in Table B-5 and Table B-6. Each question is given a classification 
based on the rules for classifying risk statements. The class of each question is then combined to indicate 
the risk category. 
The criticality of the risk is determined by the designated risk category. Critical risks are then further 
addressed in the risk management process with the use of quantitative methods 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008). 
Any risks that are categorised higher than medium     should be considered as critical. Distributions, 
such as   , where the upper limit is greater than  should also be considered as critical.  
 
 
Figure 4-4: Limits of Criticality 
4.1.2.2 Additional Functions of the Risk Diagnosing Methodology  
The RDM also provides a measure of the level of risk for the enterprise as a whole. This measure is 
estimated by first assigning weights to each risk category. The weighting assignment of risk categories 
will follow the method in Halman & Keizer. According to this method, the following assumptions are 
made (Halman & Keizer 1994): 
 The risk categories represent discrete positions on a linear risk dimension within the ranges of 
safe to fatal 
 The discrete positions on the linear risk dimension are equidistant from one another 
 The risk category   is assumed to have a weighting of 0 
Applying the assumptions, the following weights are assigned to each risk category.  
      
      
      
      
      
SAFE LOW MEDIUM HIGH FATAL
CriticalNon-Critical
Safe to Fatal = Critical
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Once this has been completed, the total enterprise risk can be measured on a scale of 0 – 100. First, the 
risk categories are summed to determine the total number of safe risks, medium risks, high risks etc. 
Then the number of each type of risk is then multiplied by the respective risk category weighting. The 
total level of risk is obtained using the following formula: 
                                 
The maximum total risk level           is attained when all the risks are category   risks. The 
minimum total risk level occurs when all the risks are category   risks. The current level of risk which 
an enterprise operates within can be determined as: 
           
       
           
 
The measure of total risk           level is a beneficial technique to give the management an idea of 
whether the enterprise is operating within the desired risk appetite. 
Many of the risks will be categorised as distributions (  –   or   –   ). For distributions, a pessimistic 
and optimistic case can be assumed. In the pessimistic case, the risk is assumed to be at the undesired 
category. For example,   –    would then become . For the optimistic case, the opposite is true. 
Figure 4-5 is a graphic representation of the overall level of risk within an enterprise. At the right 
extreme is the worst case scenario, where all risks are fatal. At the left extreme is the best case scenario, 
when all risks are safe. The shaded band within the figure represents the distribution of opinions with 
respect to the total risk level of the enterprise. The width of the band can be a further indication of the 
dispersion of opinions due to non-consensus.  
 
Figure 4-5: Graphical representation of overall enterprise risk redrawn from (Halman & Keizer 
1994) 
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4.1.3 Risk Impact and Likelihood Evaluation 
The assessment of any risk typically involves determining the likelihood that the risk will occur and the 
impact of the risk. The threat level or expected loss of a risk event is calculated using the expected value 
model (INCOSE 2007). This model states that risk can be calculated as: 
                          
Risk assessment can be performed with varying degree of complexity. Usually, the more complex 
quantitative techniques are reserved for critical risks, provided that enough information and resources 
are available. Simpler qualitative techniques are sufficient when the risks are non-critical and well 
understood, or necessary when lacking data. 
4.1.3.1 Qualitative Technique 
Qualitative risk assessment is the most basic form of risk assessment. Although the results of qualitative 
risk management are often subjective, it can be advantageous to use qualitative assessment when the 
risks are non-critical since this technique is implemented relatively quickly. 
4.1.3.2 Qualitative Risk Assessment Process 
Qualitative assessment involves evaluating the risk impact and probability on non-empirical weighting 
scales. The procedure for qualitative assessment of the risk impact and likelihood is shown in this 
section. 
(i) Step: 1 Define the weighting for the Impact and Likelihood 
Table 4-6 and Table 4-7 describe the weighting assignment for the likelihood and impact respectively. 
 
Table 4-6: Scoring scheme for Qualitative risk likelihood assessment 
Weight Description Likelihood of occurrence 
1 Rare Very low 
2 Unlikely Low 
3 Possible, 50/50 chance Medium 
4 Highly possible High 
5 Almost Certain Very high 
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Table 4-7: Scoring scheme for Qualitative risk impact assessment 
Weight Description Impact 
1 Safe  Insignificant 
2 Impact noticeable, not serious Minor  
3 Severe if ignored Moderate 
4 Severe, requires mitigation Major 
5 Crippling for enterprise, avoid if possible Catastrophic 
 
The following assumptions were made with respect to the impact and probability weighting scales: 
 The impact and likelihood weighting are evaluated on common scales.  
 Each weighting represents a discrete position on a linear impact or likelihood dimension 
 The discrete positions are equidistant 
 A rare risk was allocated with a 1. The weighting assignments 2 to 5 were obtained using the 
equidistant assumption. 
 A safe risk was allocated with a 1. The weighting assignments 2 to 5 were obtained using the 
equidistant assumption. 
(ii) Step 2: Setting up the Risk Questionnaire 
A questionnaire which contains a list of all the identified risks is drawn up and the participants are asked 
to rate the risks based on the impact and likelihood.  
(iii)Step 3: Completing the Risk Assessment 
Each participant provides a score for the risk likelihood and impact according to the scales in Table 4-6 
and Table 4-7 respectively. See Appendix A for the risk questionnaire used in this study. 
Following this, the results are aggregated to determine the mean impact and probability. The sample 
standard deviation is then calculated with respect to the assigned weightings 
If the standard deviation is greater than 1.5, it implies that a lack of consensus exists. Management may 
then decide to provide clarification on the risks.  
Qualitative analysis is advantageous for the assessment of non-critical risks. Management may have a 
reasonably good understanding of the risk characteristics. It is also important that non-critical risks, 
which can be resolved quickly, are not over-managed.  
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4.1.3.3 Quantitative Techniques 
Qualitative assessment of risk is sufficient when the risks are non-critical. However, as the risks become 
critical, quantitative assessment should be considered. A quantitative assessment provides a more 
detailed analysis of the risk (Mojtahedi, Mousavi & Makui 2010). 
Quantitative risk management is performed on risks that have been categorised as potentially or 
substantially impacting objectives (Duncan 1996). Using the AHP and the RDM, the enterprise is able to 
identify the risks that have the potential to severely impact the objectives of the enterprise.  
Quantitative analysis of risk usually involves using more complex techniques to assess the impact and 
probability of the risks. Two categories of quantitative assessment are commonly used. These are: 
 Non-probabilistic Models 
 Probabilistic Models 
A typical non-probabilistic model is sensitivity analysis. In sensitivity analysis, the risk is assumed to 
have occurred and the impact is calculated. A multitude of risks are simulated and the impact measured. 
Once the impact of each critical risk is measured, the effect on the objectives is estimated.  
Probabilistic modelling involves representing a given data set with a probability density function (PDF). 
Probability density functions, also called probability models, describe the probability of observing a 
specific value in a given range (Mojtahedi, Mousavi & Makui 2010). In the absence of sufficient data, a 
probability density function characterising a given variable can be obtained from expert judgement. 
Figure 4-6 shows examples of the BETA Probability Density Function.  
 
 
Figure 4-6: Example of Beta Distributions 
a m1 m2 m3 b
f(t)
t
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In this study, the quantitative assessment of risks will be performed using the Monte Carlo Simulation 
(MCS) probabilistic modelling method. The MCS is a modelling technique that can be used to represent 
the distribution of actual data with a PDF.  
MCS can be useful for demonstrating the effect of uncertainty on the estimates of risk factors. Also, 
MCS analysis may increase the time and effort required to complete an assessment of the risks. 
However, this information provided by representing a risk distribution surpasses that of point estimation. 
The most important function of the MCS is to select the probability density function which represents 
the data set most appropriately. This process is the most challenging part of MCS. In risk management, 
the data to be modelled are the risk impact and likelihood. (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
2001). 
4.1.3.4 Estimating Risk Impact using the Monte Carlo Method 
Section 4.1.3.4 assumes that sufficient data is present to use probabilistic modelling. Based on this 
assumption, the MCS method is discussed in the following steps:  
(i) Step 1: Determine the impact distribution 
A frequency graph is used to visually inspect which probability density function best characterises the 
data. This method will show the procedure to generate the frequency graph given a set of data: 
(a) Part 1: Determine the number of bins 
A bin is an interval that is used to partition the data into classes. The number of observations within a 
particular interval yields the frequency of that class. There are no rules to determine the number of bins. 
However, a starting point for estimating the number bins required can be calculated as follows: 
                             
 Where                            
(b) Part 2: Calculate the bin width. 
The bin width is the size of the interval. First determine the minimum and maximum of the data set. 
Then calculate the difference between these values. Next, divide that answer by the number of bin 
determined in Part 1. Finally, round the number up.  
                 [ 
       
             
 ] 
When working with hundreds, rounding up to the nearest 10 is advisable, for thousands, round up to the 
nearest 100. 
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(c) Part 3: Calculating the lower limit for the intervals 
Write down the minimum value of the data set. Next, add the class width to the minimum data value to 
obtain the lower limit for the next class. Keep adding the class width to each preceding lower limit value 
until the number of lower limits calculated is equivalent to the number of bins determined in Part 1. For 
example, assume   bins were calculated in a data set with a maximum of   and a minimum of  . The 
class width would then be 
    
 
   
The Lower limits for each subsequent class can be calculated as:  
                            
   
 
                                       
Table 4-8: Calculation of lower limits for frequency distribution 
Class Number Lower Limit 
    
                
                
  . 
  . 
               
 
(d) Part 4: Calculating the upper limit for the intervals 
The upper limit is the highest value that can be located in a particular interval. The upper limit of a 
particular class is calculated by subtracting 1 from the class width and adding it to the lower limit of that 
class. Following the explanation of lower limits, assume   bins were calculated in a data set with a 
maximum of   and a minimum of  . The class width would then be 
    
 
  
The upper limit is then calculated as: 
                                  [ 
   
 
   ] 
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(e) Part 5: Determining the Frequency Distribution 
Each class will now be defined by an interval that has an upper and lower limit. The number of 
observations that are located within a specific interval is the frequency of that class. A histogram of the 
frequency can then be plotted (See Figure 6-8).  
(f) Part 6: Identifying the Probability Density Function for Risk Impact 
The next step is to determine which probability model describes the data. There are many types of 
probability models in statistics but the more commonly used models are those shown in Figure D-1 in 
Appendix D. 
The most applicable probabilistic density function can then be selected based on visual inspection of the 
frequency graph for the data set. If the frequency graph resembles a specific PDF, it is possible that the 
data can be described by that PDF. Before selecting a specific PDF, the mechanistic properties of the 
PDF’s must also be considered.  
 Mechanistic Considerations 
Mechanistic aspects of probability models relate to how it is formed. For example, the normal 
distribution is the result of adding random variables. The log – normal PDF is formed by the 
multiplication of random variables. Therefore, mechanistic considerations may necessitate that a given 
probability model cannot be used to describe a data set even though visual inspection indicates a positive 
correlation between the data and the PDF shape. Thus the following statement is made (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency 2001): 
“In all cases, it is incumbent on the risk assessor to explain clearly and fully the reasoning 
underlying the choice of a probability model for a given variable—primarily from a mechanistic 
standpoint if possible.” 
Table D-1 lists some of the commonly used PDFs. Note that this table is not a comprehensive list of 
every type of PDF, only those that are commonly used. Mechanistic considerations are presented in the 
second column of Table D-1. 
The Poisson, Weibull, Exponential and Gamma probability are related to the estimation of observing a 
number of discrete events. The binomial probability model is typically used when one wants to 
determine the probability of observing a given number of discrete events. The actual risk event is a 
discrete occurrence, however the impact is not. Thus the Binomial, Poisson, Weibull, Exponential and 
Gamma PDFs will not be considered for modelling the risk impact. The triangular PDF is only used 
when very limited information is available. Even when very limited information is available, the use of 
the triangular PDF can be avoided by assuming a BETA distribution (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency 2001). 
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For the study of risk impact variability, the mechanistic considerations restrict the applicable PDFs to 
the following: 
 Normal 
 Log-Normal 
 Beta 
 Uniform 
The normal probability model and log-normal model are related. For example, if a variable   is 
described by the log-normal model, then log(x) is described by the normal probability model. In some 
cases, more than one probability density function can approximate a data set. In general, the preferred 
choice would be the simplest probability density function.  
(ii) Step 2: Calculating Distribution Parameters 
Once the distribution has been successfully identified, parameters of the distribution need to be 
calculated. Table 4-9 lists the various parameters that describe the PDFs that are most applicable in 
impact estimation. 
Table 4-9: Distribution Parameters 
Distribution Parameter required 
Normal  [µ, σ] 
Beta  [α, β, A, B] 
Log-normal  [µ, σ, A, B] 
Uniform [A, B] 
            
            
         
                        
                                    
(a) The Minimum and Maximum 
The minimum    and maximum     are the smallest and largest value in the data set respectively.  
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(b) The Mean and Standard Deviation  
In order to calculate the mean and standard deviation for a specific risk, historical data pertaining to the 
impact of the risk is required. This study will consider the monetary impact of risks. The time schedule 
impact of risks can also be investigated using MCS. In this study, however, we have delimited the 
impacts of risks to monetary losses. 
(c) Distribution shape parameters 
The Beta probability density function requires the estimation of two shape parameters   and . For the 
general beta probability model defined on the domain      , the following equations apply: 
   
       
   
 
    
         
             
 
Rearranging the equations for   and   respectively, yields the following equations: 
    
   
   
                   
   
   
 
where 
   
          
  
 
(iii)Step 3: Testing the Goodness-of-Fit (GoF) 
Visual inspection and consideration of the mechanistic properties of a specific PDF is insufficient to 
ensure that the data will be represented accurately. A statistical test is a necessity. Therefore, once the 
PDF has been chosen, the quality of the model fit must be tested. A Goodness-of-Fit (GoF) test is a 
statistical analysis technique for testing the hypothesis that a specific PDF fits a set of data (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency 2001). 
In hypothesis testing, the null      hypothesis is assumed to be true unless proven otherwise. Typically, 
the objective of hypothesis testing is to reject the   in favour of the alternative hypothesis  .  
By contrast, a Goodness-of-Fit, the hypotheses are set up in the following way: 
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Since the null hypothesis      states that the data set is described by a specific probability density 
function and the alternative hypothesis      states that the data cannot be described by the chosen 
probability density function, it is preferable not to reject the  .  
Several techniques are available to perform a goodness of fit test, namely: 
 Shapiro-Wilk 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 
 Chi-Square 
 Anderson Darling 
This not an exhaustive list of possible tests, however, these methods can be found in most general 
statistical literature. The chi-square test was selected to check the goodness-of-fit in this study. The chi-
square can be used to test any probability model fit, it is easily implemented and uses the frequency 
distribution which has been calculated in step 1, reducing the number of computations (Franke, Ho & 
Christie 2012). 
(a) Determine the frequency for the expected values  
In the previous step, the frequency distribution of actual observations was calculated. The same 
procedure should be followed for the expected values. Since the total number of bins, and classes 
defined by specific intervals have already been calculated in step 1, the only task left is to use the PDF 
to determine the number of expected observations in each class. 
Once the frequency of the observed and expected values have been determined, the Chi-Square test 
value can be calculated as follows: 
     
  ∑
       
 
  
 
   
 
 
                                          
                                           
                        
Two, essentially identical, methods can be used to determine whether to reject the null hypothesis or not. 
Both methods require the individual performing the test to set the confidence limits. The confidence 
limits are typically set at 95%. This implies that the rejection or non–rejection of the null hypothesis 
should be done with a 95% confidence that the correct decision was made. The error      is then 5%.  
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The methods are as follows: 
 Method 1: Comparing the      
  test statistic to a value on the Chi- square distribution tables. 
The test statistic     
   must be compared to a value on the Chi- square distribution (     
  ) table where 
the value of interest on the table has the following properties: 
         –    
                        
                       
                                  (This will be 1 for GoF tests in this study)  
With the error value 
      
     
  can then be found from Chi-Square tables in literature using the    and the error value   . The 
following comparison is then performed: 
            
           
                
            
          
                       
Since the objective is not to reject the null hypothesis, the preferable result would be when the calculated 
test statistic is less than the critical value obtained from the tables.  
 
 Method 2: Comparing the probability of observing      
  test statistic to α. 
While the Chi-square distribution tables can be used for this method, it requires some effort to complete. 
Thus for this method Microsoft EXCEL is used. The CHIDIST function in EXCEL returns the 
probability given a specific value for       
  and the degrees of freedom. The degrees of freedom are 
calculated as in method 1. 
The goal is to find the probability of observing a value that is at least as large as the calculated test 
statistic     
 . The probability of observing  (     
 ) is then compared to α.  
The following conclusion can then be made from the comparison: 
                            (     
 )                                
                         (     
 )                                       
Since the objective is not to reject the null hypothesis, the preferable result would be when the 
probability of observing a value at least as large as      
  is greater than α. 
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4.1.3.5 Estimating Risk Impact using Expert Judgement  
Quantifying the risk using probability models requires reliable data. In the absence data or data that is 
unreliable, expert judgement can be used to determine the statistics of the data set. It must be noted that 
judgements elicited from experts are subjective in nature and as such, reflect the preferences of the 
individual.  
The Project Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) can be used to estimate the data set statistics. In this 
method, a pessimistic, optimistic and most likely estimate of the impact is elicited by expert judgement, 
after which the mean can be calculated according to: 
 
         
      
 
 
 
The standard deviation is assumed to one-sixth of the range [A, B] 
 
          
   
 
 
Where  
                         
                         
                          
 
The PERT method is based on the assumption that the data set will approximate a Beta Distribution 
(Nicholas & Steyn 2008). The shape parameters for the PERT-Beta distribution can be calculated in 
using the same procedure in section 4.1.3.4. Since it is assumed that a beta distribution approximates the 
data, there is no need to select a PDF and perform goodness-of-fit tests 
If reliable expert judgement cannot be obtained, qualitative assessment should be used until reliable data 
or expert judgement becomes available. 
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Figure 4-7: Procedure for Quantitative Impact Estimation 
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Figure 4-8: Procedure for Quantitative Impact Estimation Continued 
 
4.1.3.6 Estimating Risk Likelihood 
The risk likelihood is an indication of how often the risk occurs. While many frameworks provide 
techniques for evaluating the risk impact, the likelihood assessment is often unclear (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency 2001).  
The likelihood estimation is difficult because the concept is not as apparent and easily understood as the 
risk impact. Furthermore, risk likelihood tends to be influenced not only by the nature of risk but also 
human behaviour. It becomes very difficult to account for human behaviour in a mathematic model 
(Hillson & Hulett 2004). 
Despite these shortcomings, the ability of the enterprise to model risk likelihood is important, as a 
wholly subjective estimate or guessing a value tends to undermine the process. Since data regarding risk 
likelihood is sparse, the distribution is assumed to follow one of the PDFs in Table D-1.  
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(i) Mechanistic Considerations 
The Poisson, Weibull, Exponential and Gamma probability are related to the estimation of the time or 
distance between discrete events. Since desired data is risk likelihood, which is probability of the event 
occurring and not time between discrete events, these PDFs are eliminated from consideration. 
The uniform probability model will assume that the risk likelihood remains the same. This is not true for 
risk likelihood since it is influenced by human behaviour. Thus, the uniform PDF is eliminated.  
The normal and log-normal require the mean and standard deviation. As stated previously, data 
regarding the risk likelihood are in most cases not available, thus, the mean and standard deviation 
cannot be calculated empirically. Expert judgement may be used but risk likelihood is not so easily 
understood and is affected by the nature of risk and human behaviour. Management would be hard-
pressed to define reasonably accurate estimates for risk likelihood. 
After consideration of the mechanistic properties (See Table D-1), it was found that the beta and 
binomial distributions are the most applicable for modelling the risk likelihood. Next, the characteristics 
of any given activity that is analogous to characteristics of the beta and binomial probability models are 
discussed. 
Consider the case when an activity has the following attributes: 
 The activity consists of N identical repetitions. 
This implies the activity associated with the risk is repeated N times within a given time-frame. 
 Each time the activity is repeated, one of two possible outcomes is possible. 
 Standards practices dictate that one outcome is failure and the other a success 
In terms of risk management, a success occurs when the activity is performed without the risk 
happening. By contrast, failure is when the risk occurs while performing the activity.  
 Independence between each repetition. 
Independence implies that each preceding repetition does not affect the current repetition. While slightly 
inaccurate, this assumption is reasonable if employees follow safety procedures each time an activity is 
performed. 
If an activity can be defined using these characteristics, the value of interest is the probability of 
success     .  
Using binomial probability density function, the probability of success      is an input with the output 
being the probability of observing a given number of successes     in a defined amount of repetitions, 
on the one hand. Using the Beta model, the probability of observing a certain number of successes is an 
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input ( ), with the output being the probability of success     . Since the output of the beta distribution 
offers the desired value    , it is the most appropriate model choice. 
The attributes above are particularly useful in characterising operational or day-to-day activities that are 
routinely performed. If the activity does not have the stated characteristics, such as a once-off activity, 
then the beta distribution cannot be used. The options available are then: 
 Option 1: Use the impact distribution to obtain a point estimate for likelihood 
 Option 2: Use expert judgement to obtain a discrete point estimate for the probability 
 Option 3: Use qualitative analysis for the impact and likelihood. 
(ii) Procedure for using the BETA distribution to model likelihood 
When using the beta distribution, the following inputs are required to obtain the desired result:  
 Random variable    
 Shape parameter    
 Shape parameter    
The random variable   is the probability of observing given success       when performing   
repetitions. The parameters of the beta distribution   and   can be regarded as the number of successes 
and failures respectively. Recall that a success is defined as the completion of the activity without the 
risk occurring. A failure is defined by the risk occurring while performing the activity. 
Assuming a set of data has a specific number of successes, failures, and probability for observing 
successes    , the beta distribution will yield the probability for success     . The probability of success 
     is equivalent to the likelihood of performing the activity without the risk occurring. Thus: 
                      
Where  
                             
(a) Number of successes and failures 
The number of failures   will be determined by the risk appetite of the enterprise. The estimate for the 
number of failures will be determined by management. Knowing the number of failures, the number of 
successes     can be calculated by subtracting the number of failures from the total number of 
repetitions, . 
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(b) The probability of observing the given number of successes,    
The probability of observing the number successes     will not be known. Instead of using a discrete 
point estimate for  , Monte Carlo Simulation is used to generate random values for  . 
(c) The Risk Likelihood 
Using MCS, each randomly generated value of  , will yield a value for    from the beta probability 
model. The risk likelihood can then be calculated according to: 
                      
Since multiple values for    will be calculated, the risk likelihood will not be a discrete value but a 
distribution of values described by the beta probability density function. 
 
 
Figure 4-9: Procedure for risk likelihood estimation 
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4.1.3.7 Risk Expected loss 
The expected loss of the risk is analogous to the threat level. The only difference is that threat level is 
referred to when using qualitative analysis and expected losses is referred to when using quantitative 
analysis. The threat/expected losses can be calculated using the following formula: 
 
                                
 
 
Figure 4-10: Determining the threat level empirical distribution 
 
The probability density function of the likelihood and probability density of the impact is multiplied to 
yield an empirical distribution for the risk threat. The risk threat/expected loss distribution is then used 
to determine the risk response strategy according to the procedure in section 6.6. 
 
4.1.3.8 Limitations of Quantitative Techniques 
Probability models require detailed numerical information. In some cases, the requisite data may not 
exist.  
Furthermore, risks can be vague and undefined, requiring subjective assessment. Classical probability 
models cannot handle subjectivity. Therefore, qualitative risk analysis should be used when the risks are 
poorly defined or understood. (Dey 2010). 
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(i) The PERT methodology limitations  
(a) Expert judgement 
The sensitivity of PERT to the expert judgement can be significant (MacCrimmon & Ryavec 1962). 
Thus, it is recommended that PERT only be used if reliable expert judgement is available. When no 
reliable judgements can be made, qualitative risk assessment should be used. 
(b) The beta distribution assumption  
This assumption states that a distribution with a three-point estimate for mean, and a standard deviation 
one-sixth of the range       can be approximated by a beta probability model. Farnum & Stanton has 
shown that the error related to the beta distribution assumption depends on the mode. The mode is a 
measure of central tendency of the beta distribution can be calculated using: 
      
   
     
 
If the mode varies from                              , the error in the mean and standard 
deviation estimates can be regarded insignificant (Farnum & Stanton 1987). 
(ii) Monte Carlo simulation Limitations 
While MCS is very flexible and has virtually no limits to the analysis that can be done, the solutions are 
not exact but estimates, and the accuracy of the solution depends the reliability of the data and the 
number of repeated simulations.  
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CHAPTER 5 SELECTING A RISK RESPONSE STRATEGY  
5.1  Introduction 
Chapter 4 introduced the method to determine whether a risk is critical or non-critical. The methods for 
evaluating critical risks quantitatively and non-critical risks using qualitative methods are also shown in 
the previous chapter. This chapter will show how risk assessment and risk response are interlinked. 
The complexity in choosing a risk response will depend on whether the risk is critical or not. Using 
RDM and AHP, the criticality of the risk can be determined. However, risk response types are 
frequently chosen without considering the characteristics of the enterprise and the internal environment 
(Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008). This chapter will present qualitative and quantitative methods for selecting the 
response strategy  
5.1.1 Qualitative Technique 
Steinberg et al. have noted that risks which present a low threat level should be accepted as the cost of 
doing business and thus, it is not necessary to further address these risks. Moderate threat level risks 
may require strategies that reduce the impact and/or likelihood. If possible, the enterprise may seek to 
share the impact of moderate risks with stakeholders. High threat level risks must be avoided by the 
enterprise by the implementation of certain control measures (Steinberg et al. 2004). 
These guidelines are based on intuitive knowledge and best practice principles. The preferred response 
may vary depending on the enterprise. In the case of non-critical risks, it may be appropriate for 
management to use this method as it expedites the risk management process. However, critical risks 
require a more in depth analysis. A simple technique that is widely employed to determine the response 
is a risk matrix (Nicholas & Steyn 2008). 
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Figure 5-1: Risk matrix 
Figure 5-1 shows the risk map that will be used to choose the risk response qualitatively. The X-axis 
represents the likelihood and the Y-axis represents the impact of risks. The product of risk impact and 
likelihood will yield a threat level value corresponding to one of four areas on the risk map: 
 The Green area represents Low threat level risks (threat = 1 – 2 ) 
 The Yellow area represents Medium threat level risks (threat = 3 – 6 ) 
 The Orange area represents High threat level (threat = 8 – 16 ) 
 The Red area represents Fatal Threat level risks (threat = 20 – 25 ) 
The areas on the map correspond to the following risk response strategies: 
 Red = Avoid 
 Orange = Reduce/Share 
 Yellow = Reduce/Share 
 Green = Accept 
By definition, non-critical risks should not pose a major threat to business objectives, thus, it is expected 
that all of the non-critical risks should fall into the green, yellow and the orange areas within the risk 
matrix. If non-critical risks fall within the red area within the risk matrix, the process of determining 
which risks are critical should be revisited.  
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Figure 5-2: Procedure for Reclassification of risks 
5.1.2 Quantitative Technique 
The rationale behind the choice of a risk-response strategy is often missing or based on experience 
without proper consideration of enterprise characteristics and the properties of the risk. The method 
proposed by Fan, Lin & Sheu develops a mathematical relationship between the risk-handling cost, 
enterprise characteristics and risk properties.  
The proposed model can, theoretically, be used for both critical and non-critical risks. However, it is 
time-consuming and impractical to evaluate all risks using this method. For this reason, the method will 
be applied to critical risks only. 
According to this method, three risk handling strategies are observed. The first strategy is risk 
prevention and the second is risk adaptation. The final, risk handling strategy, is a combination of risk 
prevention and risk adaptation (Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008). 
Risk prevention refers to the reduction of the risk probability. Risk adaptation is the implementation of 
plans that reduce the loss associated with risk events. In the combined risk handling strategy, the extent 
to which the risk is prevented and adapted to will depend on the characteristics of enterprise, respective 
risk handling costs of each option and the nature of the risk itself. 
Risk response and risk handling are used interchangeably in this section. 
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Figure 5-3: Graphical representation of risk handling strategies (Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008) 
 
In Figure 5-3, the curve    represents the risk profile before a risk handling strategy is applied. The 
curve    represents the risk profile after the risk handling strategy has been applied.  
It follows that    and    are the risk likelihood and risk impact before handling respectively.    and    
are the risk likelihood and impact after risk handling has been applied such that: 
      
      
The risk profile    represents the various combinations of    and   . The values for    which forms 
the curve are calculated as          
The risk profile    is calculated as            . Any specific value on    or    is called the 
expected loss. However, a value on    is an unacceptable expected loss whereas a value on    is called 
an acceptable expected loss. 
The purpose of risk handling is to reduce the expected loss from    to    where        .  
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5.1.2.1 Risk Prevention 
In Figure 5-3, risk prevention is the pathway YC, thus the purpose of risk prevention is the reduction of 
the risk probability   (Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008). From Figure 5-3 it can be seen that for risk prevention: 
        and  
         
Thus for risk prevention, the probability of occurrence is reduced while the magnitude of the impact 
remains the same.  
5.1.2.2 Risk Adaptation 
Risk adaptation follows the pathway YA in Figure 5-3. In adaptation, management has decided that the 
best method to deal with the risk is by lowering the impact    . From this it can be seen that:  
        and  
         
In risk adaptation, the probability of occurrence remains the same while the magnitude of the impact is 
reduced.  
5.1.2.3 Risk Prevention-Adaptation 
The third risk-handling strategy is a combination of both risk prevention and risk adaptation. Referring 
to Figure 5-3, the mixed methods approach follows the pathway YB. The use of this method results in: 
            and  
              
For the prevention-adaptation combination any point of    between point C and A is a possible 
solution. However each point on    between C and A will have different cost associated with it. The 
lowest cost solution will be the most attractive one 
5.1.2.4 Factors affecting the Risk Response Strategy Choice 
Before a risk handling strategy is chosen, the factors affecting the strategy choice must be defined and 
understood. Fan, Lin & Sheu have developed a conceptual framework based on previous observations of 
construction projects. The framework revealed that the choice of a risk handling strategy is a function of 
the controllability of the risk, risk handling costs and the enterprise characteristics. (Fan, Lin & Sheu 
2008) 
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Figure 5-4: Conceptual framework of factors affecting choice of risk handling strategy adapted 
from (Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008) 
(i) Controllability 
The controllability refers to the ability of the enterprise to change the probability distribution of the risk 
(Miller & Lessard 2001). Low controllability is associated with events such as natural disasters, 
government legislation and external economic conditions. In these cases little or nothing can be done to 
change the risk likelihood distribution. In the case of high controllability, the likelihood distribution of 
the risk can be changed considerably.  
Controllability can affect the choice of risk handling strategy in one of two ways. Low control usually 
implies higher cost of handling whereas high control typically involves lower costs. However, this may 
not necessarily be true for all risks. In some cases, it may be equally expensive to handle risks with high 
controllability.  
Intuitively, a risk prevention strategy would be used for risks with high levels of control whereas a risk 
adaptation strategy would be used for risks with low levels of control. Note that the terms 
“controllability” and “level of control” are used interchangeably. 
(ii) Enterprise Characteristics 
Enterprise characteristics are factors that affect the way an enterprise operates; these factors can be 
internal or external. Factors that affect the choice of the risk handling strategy may include: 
 Expertise 
 Risk management infrastructure 
 Size of the enterprise 
 Enterprise complexity 
 External economic factors 
 Risk appetite 
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(iii)Risk Handling Costs 
Risk handling costs refer to the expenses incurred when implementing a selected risk handling strategy. 
The method developed by Fan, Lin & Sheu and adapted for ERM assumes that risk handling costs are a 
function of the controllability and the enterprise characteristics (Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008).  
5.1.2.5 Risk Handling Cost Model  
The nomenclature used in this section is summarised in the table below.  
Table 5-1: Variables in risk handling cost model 
    Risk likelihood prior to risk handling 
    Estimated monetary loss due to the risk event prior to risk handling 
    Unacceptable expected monetary loss from the risk event              
    Risk likelihood after risk-handling 
    Monetary loss from the risk event after risk-handling  
    Acceptable expected monetary loss from the risk event             
   Unit risk prevention cost 
   Proportion of uncertainty that cannot be reduced / controlled         
     Controllability of risk 
   Opportunity cost or interest rate,       
 
Risk handling involves the application of risk prevention and/or risk adaptation, thus, the total risk-
handling cost is the sum of risk prevention and risk adaptation: 
            
Where 
     is the total risk handling cost 
   is the cost of risk prevention 
   is the cost of risk adaptation 
(i) Risk Prevention  
In the case of risk prevention, the resulting probability and impact after mitigation measures are:  
        and  
        respectively (See Figure 5-3).  
Thus the prevention cost (    is a function of the risk probability. The equation for calculating the    
value has been developed by applying the assumptions and properties: 
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    and    are inversely proportional. This means that as probability of a risk event is decreased, 
the cost of risk handling increases. 
 When        ,      . No risk handling cost is present as the post likelihood is equal to the 
prior likelihood.  
     is slope of the    function. This is also referred to the marginal prevention cost. The slope 
of    is negative due to the inverse relationship between    and    (see Figure 5-5).  
 As    approaches 0 the marginal cost     approaches infinity. In other words, it becomes 
unfeasibly expensive to reduce the probability when it is already a low. 
 
 
Figure 5-5: Graphical representation of risk prevention cost 
(a) The Unit Prevention Cost, k 
Uncertainty is partially due to a lack of information regarding the likelihood or impact of an event (ISO 
31000:2009, Risk Management—Principles and Guidelines 2009). Thus, to reduce the value of    more 
information is required although this may be difficult. The unit prevention cost  , is a measure of the 
difficulty in obtaining information to control the risk such that     . Examples given in Fan, Lin & 
Sheu approximate   between 0 and 1000 (Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008). 
The value of   is determined by the enterprise characteristics such as the technical complexity of the 
enterprise, internal environment, political factors and can be estimated by expert judgement. 
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(b) Uncontrollable Aspect of Risk, ω 
Any risk has an uncontrollable proportion of uncertainty that cannot be removed feasibly. This 
uncontrollable aspect is called omega ( ). From this, the level of control of a risk can be calculated as: 
                      
A visual representation of how the level of control and the probability of a specific risk can be seen in 
Figure 5-6: 
 
Figure 5-6: Illustration of the risk controllability concept adapted from (Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008) 
The segments are: 
            This represents the percentage of uncertainty that can be feasibly removed  
          This represents the percentage of uncertainty that was not removed by applying a 
specific risk handling strategy, although technically it can be removed. 
Where            
When the segment        is large, the implication is that there is a low degree of controllability 
associated with the risk.  
Table 5-2: Assessing the Level of Control 
ω Implication for Risk controllability Level of Control (1 - ω ) 
0 Essentially avoidable through application of risk 
control actions. Prevention advised 
Total Control 
0.2 Largely controllable. Prevention is possible High Level of Control 
0.4 Uncertainty can be reduced significantly.  Moderate Control 
0.6 Uncertainty can be reduced but not significantly Low Level of Control 
0.8 Risk is largely uncontrollable. Adaptation should 
be considered. 
Minimal Control 
1 Risk is unavoidable. Adaptation advised No Control 
 
It has been noted that assessing the level of control is more natural than assessing the lack of control. 
Thus, participants in the risk management process should provide expert judgement on the level of 
control       as opposed to the amount of uncontrollability (Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008).  
0  P1
P2
Uncontrollable
Uncertainty that can be removed 
with risk handling
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
63 
Chapter 5 | Selecting A Risk Response Strategy 
(c) Prevention Cost Model 
The risk prevention cost equation can be derived using the following procedure: 
The value of       which is the slope of a tangent to the curve in Figure 5-5, can be defined as a 
function of   ,  and   by the following equation: 
     
  
      
 
Taking the integral from    to    of the slope function (   ) will then yield the risk prevention cost 
function   : 
    ∫    
  
  
    
    ∫
  
      
  
  
       (
    
    
) 
Thus, the cost prevention function is written as: 
      (
    
    
) 
(ii) Risk Adaptation  
The purpose of the risk adaptation is to reduce the loss associated with risk events. This study was 
restricted to monetary losses. Mitigation in risk adaptation is achieved by the addition of a buffer to 
absorb all or part of associated monetary loss. 
Insurance is a commonly used method for a risk adaptation buffer. Alternatively, management may 
decide to establish contingency reserves to reduce the impact of the risks. In this study, we will limit 
ourselves to the use of an insurance policy to cover the loss associated with risk events when using the 
adaptation strategy. In the case of risk adaptation, the resulting posterior likelihood and impact are:  
        and  
          
The rate of investment or insurance rate can be used in the estimation of the cost of adaptation    with 
the following assumptions and properties: 
    is inversely proportional to   . This means that as the loss associated with the risk is 
decreased, the adaptation cost increases. 
 When        ,    = 0, no risk handling cost is present as the post loss is equal to the prior 
loss. 
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     is the slope of the    function. This is also referred to as the marginal adaptation cost and 
the slope    is constant. 
 As the losses increase, the insurance cost increases in direct proportion. The marginal adaptation 
cost (   ) when using the adaptation strategy is the insurance rate   (See Figure 5-7). 
 
Figure 5-7: Graphical representation of adaptation cost 
(a) Adaptation Cost Model 
From Figure 5-7, the equation for the risk adaptation cost    can be derived using the following 
procedure: 
   
   
   
 
       
     
 
Since     = 0 (see Figure 5-7) the resulting equation becomes: 
  
    
     
 
             
The cost of adaptation is a scalar quantity which only requires the magnitude to fully describe it; thus, 
taking the absolute value of both sides of the equation yields: 
|   |  |        | 
The right-hand side of the equation will always be larger than zero since     and         . Thus, 
the equation for the risk adaptation cost becomes: 
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(iii)Total Risk Handling Cost CTOT 
For any given risk event, the total cost of handling (    ) is the sum of both the adaptive and 
preventative methods as shown below: 
            
         (
    
    
)           
 
5.1.2.6 Optimisation Analysis 
The cost function is used to perform an optimisation analysis in order to identify the optimal strategy to 
reduce the risk from profile    to profile    at the lowest cost given a specific risk with known 
properties            . The optimisation is as follows: 
                   
                      
                     
                     
Now, it can be said that the ratio between    and    can be written as: 
  
  
  
           
Now, substitution of    in terms of    and  can be performed, yielding:  
                   
                       
                     
                     
                   
The first constraint can be rearranged in order to find    in terms of   : 
   
   
  
  
Now substituting    into the function     , the total cost function             can be written as: 
    (   
   
  
) 
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Finally, the optimisation problem in terms of    is derived as: 
          (   
   
  
)  
                  
                    
                   
                 
Notice that the domain of     has been restricted to a different value on the lower bound because     is 
the lowest feasible value of    (Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008). In other words, it would not be feasible to 
reduce the probability to a value of 0. Any attempt to decrease the risk probability to a very small value 
would result in a      that tends to infinity. 
5.1.2.7 Results of the Optimisation Analysis 
From the optimisation analysis, a graph of   vs. 
   
 
 can be derived. The method for this is as follows 
(Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008): 
First, it is assumed that the optimum probability    is located at the upper limit of the restricted 
domain          . When the optimum probability is located at the upper limit, it implies an 
adaptation strategy is preferred (Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008) and thus: 
        
The equation to calculate the optimum probability (  ) obtained from the optimisation analysis in (Fan, 
Lin & Sheu 2008) is then equated to    and is shown below: 
    
    √            
  
     
Rearranging the equation yields: 
   
 
  
  
 
    
 
Secondly, it is assumed that the optimum probability    is located at the lower limit of the restricted 
domain          . When the optimum probability is located at the lower limit, it implies a 
prevention strategy is preferred and thus:  
        
Following the same procedure as above, the equation to calculate    is equated to     then rearranged: 
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    √            
  
      
   
 
  
    
 
     
 
 
The previous equations for calculating    are then used to generate Figure 5-8, which defines the zones 
in which a specific response strategy will be preferable. Various combinations of  
   
 
 and   for a given 
   value are generated to yield the asymptotes in Figure 5-8.  
Figure 5-8 can then be used to determine the optimum risk handling strategy for a specific risk. Since 
Figure 5-8 must be generated whenever a risk is evaluated quantitatively, it can become time consuming 
and ultimately costly. Thus, it is advisable that this method only be used for critical risks. 
 
Figure 5-8: Risk Handling Strategy Choices redrawn from (Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008) 
Risk prevention (zone 1) is preferred when   is small and the measure of the enterprise characteristics 
   
 
  is large. This combination represents a high level of control     , high insurance rates (large  ), 
high–risk enterprise (large  ) and/or low prevention costs (small  ). 
If the level of control tends toward low (     ), and the prevention costs are very high, a risk 
adaptation strategy (zone 3) could be preferred by management depending the characteristics of the 
enterprise,  
   
 
.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
68 
Chapter 5 | Selecting A Risk Response Strategy 
When control is almost non-existent (   ), the effects of the enterprise characteristics become 
insignificant, in which case, an adaptation strategy is always preferred. 
When the level of control is not clear, the enterprise characteristic will determine the choice of a specific 
strategy. In this case, a mixed strategy (zone 2) could be used to minimise the risk handling costs. 
(i) Effects of Controllability ( ) on the Model  
When   has a large value, the controllability        is low. The effect of controllability dominates 
the enterprise characteristics          and a risk adaptation strategy is preferred.  
As   decreases, the level of risk control       increases. When this happens, risk prevention or a 
mixed strategy becomes more likely.  
(ii) Effects of  
   
 
  on the Model  
When  is not extremely large, the effects of   
   
 
  on    become significant. 
The term 
   
 
 represents the enterprise characteristics such as enterprise complexity and size, risk 
appetite, leadership, insurance rates. In this discussion, each term in 
   
 
 will be explained and its 
respective effect on the choice of a risk handling strategy will be discussed. 
The term   is the unit cost incurred to reduce the probability to the desired level. It is a measure of how 
difficult it is to obtain information to reduce the risk likelihood. A large   value results in a higher cost 
of prevention which prompts the consideration of a risk adaptation strategy. 
The term   is the insurance rate that is paid to ensure a monetary buffer is maintained to absorb the 
impact of any potential risks. A small value for   indicates a low adaptation cost and thus, adaptation 
strategies are favoured when   is small. 
The term    is the acceptable expected loss. This value is derived based on the risk appetite of the 
enterprise and intrinsically the size of enterprise. Enterprises with high – risk management styles would 
typically have large    values. Large enterprises usually have higher    values since they are able to 
absorb more losses than smaller enterprises. Small businesses and risk – averse management styles 
would typically desire a lower    value. 
(iii)Combining the Effects of  and 
   
 
 
When 
   
 
 is large, the value of   approaches the lower bound     in the domain          and 
thus, a prevention strategy is preferred. Conversely, when 
   
 
 is small, the value of    approaches the 
upper bound    and thus, an adaptation strategy is preferred. 
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The position    in the domain           is also affected by the amount of uncontrollable 
uncertainty . When  is large (approaching 1), it means that controllability       of the risk is very 
low. In this case,    approaches the upper limit,   , and the value of  
   
 
  has an insignificant effect on 
the optimum probability. Thus,           
Thus, it can be said that when the controllability       is very low, an adaptation strategy is always 
preferred. 
As   decreases, the controllability       increases,    shifts away from the upper bound to the 
middle of the domain      
     and the effect of enterprise characteristics          on the 
choice of a risk handling strategy becomes more pronounced. A further decrease in   will see the    
value approaching the lower bound of the domain    . 
(iv)  Rules – of – Thumb for Quantitative Selection of Risk Handling Strategy 
In order to accelerate the process of choosing a risk response strategy using this method, Fan, Lin & 
Sheu have developed rule-of-thumb techniques for choosing the risk response strategy. These rules are 
based on the findings of the optimisation analysis, which show how the terms 
   
 
 and  effect optimal 
value of    also referred to as the optimum likelihood 
  (Fan, Lin & Sheu 2008). 
 
Table 5-3: The Rule-of-Thumb guidelines for choice of risk response strategy 
1.    
 
    
The effect of ω dominates choice of risk a handling strategy 
(a) The optimum solution is located at the right extreme of the domain          . This implies 
the selection of a risk adaptation strategy 
2.           Enterprise characteristics become more important as omega decreases 
(a) ω is large               
          
      regardless of the value of 
   
 
 thus adaptation is needed 
(b) ω decreasing       
               
As   decreases,    found within the domain         . The value 
of 
   
 
 determines the response strategy. Use Figure 5-8 
(c) ω small                 
           
   
 
 has a large impact on the value of     Thus prevention is needed 
i    
 
    
Pushes     to toward left extreme of the domain            thus a 
prevention strategy  
ii    
 
   
Pushes    to right extreme of the domain           thus an 
adaptation strategy. 
  
Using the rule-of-thumb guidelines, Figure 5-8 does not have to be generated for each risk, thus saving a 
considerable amount of time. 
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Figure 5-9: Procedure for selecting the optimum risk response 
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CHAPTER 6 CASE STUDY: DISCUSSION AND RESULTS 
6.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter presented the research methodology employed in this study. The current chapter 
discusses case study and the results of implementation of the methodologies in the preceding chapters. 
6.2 Case Study Review 
A case study was used in order to test whether the proposed framework was practical and systematic. 
Due to the nature of the risks, stipulations by the company and the research ethics committee of 
Stellenbosch University, the names of participants and the company remain anonymous. Certain assets 
that are synonymous with the company will be referred to as vehicles, assets or tools.  
Owing to the nature of the work undertaken at the company studied, risks are primarily operational. That 
is, they relate to the health and safety of individuals. It is also the case that the current risk management 
processes at the company are mostly qualitative although cost estimates were shown to be associated 
with specific qualitative ratings.  
Several Questionnaires were provided to the key employees of the company (see Appendix A). 
Collection of the completed questionnaire was done anonymously. 
6.3 Internal Environment 
The evaluation of the internal environment was performed using a questionnaire. The participants were 
asked to provide ratings for various statements relating to the internal environment. Each statement was 
formulated to evaluate the state of specific attributes within the company, among them: 
 Leadership and Strategy 
 People and Communication 
 Accountability and Reinforcement 
 Risk Management and Infrastructure 
The rating system for the internal environment is described in the following table. 
Table 6-1: Rating system used for Internal Environment 
Rating  Weighting 
Strongly Agree +2 
Agree +1 
Neutral 0 
Disagree -1 
Strongly disagree -2 
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When the mean ratings were found to be      then action is required and if the mean ratings were 
            then caution with respect to that attribute is noted and action is suggested. For        
   , a good correlation exists between the enterprise and the embodiment of an attribute in a positive 
way. For        , participants feel strongly that the enterprise embodies the attribute in a positive way.  
A standard deviation greater than 1.5 indicates that the participants were ambivalent. The median is also 
considered. 
Table 6-2 contains the statements used to evaluate the internal environment at the company. Ten 
statements were used to evaluate 4 characteristics of the internal environment within the enterprise.  
Table 6-2: Enterprise internal environment questionnaire results 
# Statement Attribute Mean Median Deviation SD D N A SA 
1 The leaders of my unit set a 
positive example for ethical 
conduct. 
Leadership and 
Strategy 
0.15 0 1.21 2 1 4 5 1 
2 I am aware of what is 
expected of me with respect 
to professional conduct 
Leadership and 
Strategy 
-0.38 0 1.04 2 3 7 0 1 
3 I understand the vision, 
mission and overall 
objectives of the enterprise / 
unit. 
Leadership and 
Strategy 
-0.92 -1 0.95 4 5 3 1 0 
4 Teamwork and 
communication is promoted 
by the leaders of your unit. 
People and 
Communication 
0.08 0 1.44 2 3 3 2 3 
5 Channels of communication 
to management are available. 
People and 
Communication 
-0.25 -0.5 1.22 1 5 4 0 2 
6 Disciplinary action is taken 
against employees that 
engage in unethical conduct. 
Accountability 0.18 0 1.40 1 3 3 1 3 
7 Does risk management make 
the environment a better 
place to work in? 
Risk 
Management 
-0.46 -1 1.20 1 8 2 0 2 
8 The risk management process 
is well structured. 
Risk 
Management 
-0.15 0 0.99 1 4 4 4 0 
9 Whenever a decision is made 
or a new task is undertaken, 
the risks are explicitly 
addressed. 
Risk 
Management 
-0.08 0 1.38 2 4 2 3 2 
10 Designated risk owners have 
the authority and ability to 
manage risk adequately. 
Risk 
Management 
0.27 1 1.19 1 2 2 5 1 
SA(+2) = Strongly Agree                                  A(+1) =Agree; 
N(0) = Neutral                                                   D(-1) = Disagree                             SD(-2) = Strongly Disagree 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
73 
Chapter 6 | Case Study: Discussion and Results 
6.3.1 Leadership and Strategy 
Beasley, Clune & Hermanson demonstrate that the extent of ERM understanding and implementation is 
dependent on the attitude at a senior management level. Thus leadership and strategy is one of the most 
important attributes of the internal environment that affect the ERM (Beasley, Clune & Hermanson 
2005). 
It follows that, the embodiment of ethical values through the actions of management greatly influences 
the corporate culture and norms within the enterprise. According to Table 6-2, the mean suggests that 
participants of the study perceive the actions of management as ethically questionable.  
Moreover, the standard deviation suggests that the participants are divided in their opinion with respect 
to their leaders acting ethically. This may indicate that some leaders are perceived as ethical while the 
ethics of others may be questionable. 
Although the mean and median of statement 1 suggest that management is not perceived as wholly 
unethical, action in this regard is suggested since it has been shown that questionable ethical values by 
management influence employees to act in the same way. The same applies for good ethical values 
(Steinberg et al. 2004). Unethical leadership also affects the risk management process by either creating 
situations of risk through ethically questionable actions or through dishonest representation of the risks.  
Statement 2 relates to participants knowledge of expected professional conduct. Table 6-2 indicates that 
the majority of participants are neutral. This may imply that the participants have either not read an 
existing code of conduct or the code of conduct is not made readily available.  
Honesty and integrity should be embodied in any formal code of conduct (ISO 31000:2009, Risk 
Management—Principles and Guidelines). Employees should be familiar with this document as it 
provides benchmarks against which values such as integrity, honesty and professional conduct can be 
measured. The company was advised to ensure that all employees are familiar with ethical standards of 
conduct on a regular basis. 
Table 6-2 shows that a large majority of the participants do not understand the mission, vision and 
overall objectives of the enterprise or unit within the enterprise. The definition of a risk is an event that 
affects the objectives of enterprise resulting in abnormal conditions. If the employees, and more 
specifically the risk owners, do not understand the objectives of the enterprise, then the entire risk 
management process can be called into question.  
According to ISO 31 000, the first principle of risk management is that it should create and protect value 
(See Section 2.2.2). Fundamental to creating value is the achievement of objectives. The role of risk 
management is to ensure that objectives are achieved (ISO 31000:2009, Risk Management—Principles 
and Guidelines 2009). 
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If objectives are not understood, the role and importance of risk management in protecting value cannot 
be fully realised. For this reason, the company should ensure that employees are aware of the objectives 
of the enterprise or unit. 
6.3.2 People and Communication 
The results from Table 6-2 show that teamwork and communication is promoted by management but not 
to the extent that it should be. It is the responsibility of management to ensure that all employees work 
together, as far as possible, to achieve objectives. This can only be done if the concerned parties 
understand the objectives, co-operate and communicate effectively.  
Furthermore, the sixth principle of risk management (see section 2.2.2) states that good risk 
management practice is to include information from all relevant sources. If information is not shared, the 
risk management process can become less effective. Also, risk management should be dynamic and 
responsive to change. To facilitate this dynamic behaviour, the newest information must be available at 
all times. Effective communication partly ensures the sharing of new information. 
Communication channels to management are necessary to report any irregular activities and behaviour. 
The poor rating assigned to statement 5 could be due to the fact that participants felt the communication 
channels to management were either not adequate or that nothing is done after reporting irregular 
behaviour. Reporting irregular behaviour via communication channels to management partly ensures 
that ethical standards are upheld. Communication channels can also be used to obtain clarification on the 
expected behaviour in terms of the code of conduct.  
6.3.3 Accountability  
It was expected that disciplinary action against unethical conduct would be strictly enforced in the 
company. However the ratings show a distribution wider than expected (statement 6).  
The participants were undecided as to whether unethical behaviour goes unpunished. One third of the 
participants agreed that disciplinary action is taken against unethical behaviour. The rest either stated 
that they had no opinion or that they disagreed. The indecision could be an indication that action is taken 
intermittently. The company was advised to investigate this indecision, since unethical behaviour, if left 
unchecked, gradually becomes part of an enterprise’s normal operating conditions (Steinberg et al. 
2004). 
Statement 5, channels of communication, might have received a poor rating because participants felt that 
after reporting unethical conduct, no action was taken.  
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6.3.4 Risk Management 
Four main principles (section 2.2.2) make up the foundation for effective risk management (ISO 
31000:2009, Risk Management—Principles and Guidelines 2009): 
 Facilitates continual improvement. 
 Is well structured. 
 Is considered in all decisions that expose an enterprise or its employees to risk. 
 Provides risk owners with the resources and capability to mitigate risks. 
The participants felt that caution should be noted with respect to designated risk owners having the 
capability or resources at their disposable to effectively mitigate risk.  
Firstly, consider the case when the lack of capability impedes effective risk management. According to 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, the commitment to competence is an important factor in ensuring effective 
risk management. While a trade-off between competence level and cost will always exist, the skills and 
knowledge required to complete a specific activity should not be lacking in the individual performing 
the activity (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2011). The company should investigate whether the risk owners 
have the skills and knowledge required to perform their duties effectively. 
Resource allocation is dependent on the attitude of the management towards risk management. This is 
further validated when analysing statement 9, which shows that participants did not believe that risk 
management makes the environment a better or safer place to work in. Owing to this fact, it is likely that 
management shares this philosophy to some extent. Most companies are required by law, to perform 
operational health and safety assessments. The company health and safety regulations as well as risk 
mitigation controls are then audited at the end of the financial year. 
If the company is merely adhering to the minimum required standards, it would partly validate the 
conclusion that insufficient resources are allocated, resulting in poor risk management. Poor risk 
management leads to the perception that the environment is not made a safer or better place to work in.  
From Table 6-2, it can be seen that the general perception is that risks are not explicitly addressed 
whenever a new task or decision is made (statement 9). Data provided and conversations with various 
personnel at the company, indicated that the company uses a predominantly reactive style of risk 
management. This meant that when undesirable events occur, it is recorded on an incident report.  
While this style of risk management is partly necessary, the company should also develop proactive risk 
management processes further. Proactive risk management ensure that risk management is part of every 
decision or task. It must be noted that, while beneficial, is not possible to identify all possible risks in 
advance. Thus, a reactive risk management mechanism, such as incident reports are necessary.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
76 
Chapter 6 | Case Study: Discussion and Results 
6.4 Risk Identification 
Various methods for risk identification have been offered in Chapter 3. These include working group 
techniques (Chapman 1998) and interview techniques (Spetzler & Holstein 1975). Each of these 
methods has advantages and disadvantages.  
The interview technique would have been used to identify a comprehensive list of risks. The participants 
would have been key personnel in the company. Unfortunately, this was not possible due to prior 
commitments and work schedule of the key personnel at the company. Instead, a comprehensive list of 
risks identified in 2012 was provided by the company for analysis in this study. Incident reports 
containing events that have occurred but were not yet included in the formal risk management process 
was also provided. Several risks were identified at random for analysis from these documents. These 
risks are shown in Table 6-3: 
Table 6-3: Risks identified from risk register and incident reports 
Risk ID Risk Description 
1 Inhalation of chemicals during paint stripping of components 
2 Staff member death/injury due to use of cell phones and media players 
3 Incorrect stacking and storing practices results in item falling from height injuring staff member. 
4 Shock, falling, lacerations during repairing of vehicle doors 
5 Contractor control: contractor creates risk situation resulting in injury  
6 Abuse of assets: vandalism and staff urinating in assets 
7 Abuse / Improper use of lifting equipment resulting in injury 
8 Essential equipment not working/malfunctioning leads to injury or downtime 
9 Hazardous materials handling: improper handling of solvents causes chemical fire 
10 Excessive noise and dust / debris in working area 
11 Fire control: broken / malfunctioning fire extinguishers. 
12 Recurring incidents of theft. Tools and other assets stolen 
13 Staff not wearing personal protective equipment (PPE) results in injury 
14 Staff injury due to poor procedures or procedures not being followed / enforced 
15 Removing vehicle wheels : Staff member death/injury 
16  Staff aggression towards supervisors: Supervisors abused verbally or physically. 
17 Withdrawal of contract services due to non-payment: hazardous waste handling by staff 
 
Each risk has been allocated a designated risk ID which will be referred to in the following sections. 
Appendix B shows the risks that Table 6-3 was constructed from.  
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6.4.1 Risk Classification 
Classification of the risks gives an indication of how the risks affect the enterprise as opposed to which 
objectives are affected by specific risks. Figure 3-1 depicts the classification structure that was used to 
classify the risks. As stated previously, a comprehensive list of risks was provided by the company. The 
list of risks contained only operational risks. Each operational risk was then classified either as a health, 
safety, environmental or asset risk. Classification of the risks can be seen in Table 6-4 : 
Table 6-4: Classification of risks 
Risk ID Risk Classification 
1 Inhalation of chemicals H 
2 Cell phones and media Players S 
3 Incorrect stacking and storing S 
4 Repairing vehicle doors S 
5 Contractor Control S 
6 Abuse of assets H,A 
7 Abuse of lifting equipment S 
8 Equipment not working S, A 
9 Materials handling H 
10 Noise and dust H 
11 Malfunctioning fire extinguishers S 
12 Theft A 
13 Staff not wearing PPE H, S 
14 Procedural issues S 
15 Removing vehicle wheels S 
16 Staff Aggression S 
17 Non-payment of services H 
 
Health risks are associated with the events that directly affect the efficiency of a functioning human 
body. Health risks may also manifest long after the risk event has occurred. For example, regular 
inhalation of chemicals may lead to long term pulmonary disease such as chemical pneumonia. 
Safety risks refer to events that violates a safe state of being, that is, a condition where an employee is 
protected against physical, social or emotional harm. Safety risks usually bring about immediate effects 
if not dealt with properly 
Environmental risks are associated with events that directly influence the environment such as chemical 
spills. Asset risks are events that directly affect company assets such abuse of equipment or are related 
to company assets such as the effects of non-functional machinery.  
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The abuse of assets has been classified as both an asset and health risk. This is due to the fact abuse of 
assets encompasses vandalism of assets as well as urination in the assets. Vandalism is an asset risk 
because it directly affects the company assets whereas urination in the assets poses a health threat. 
Essential equipment not working has been listed as a safety risk and an asset risk. It was classified as an 
asset risk because non-functionality impedes work efficiency and progress. Furthermore, malfunctioning 
machinery can create safety risks such as cranes malfunctioning during lifting procedures. 
Staff not wearing personal protective equipment (PPE) may lead to unsafe conditions thus, it is 
classified as a safety risk. However PPE also protects employees against health risks such as chemical 
contact with the skin etc.  
Non-payment of contract services, such as waste disposal contracts, within the company meant that 
employees are forced to handle hazardous waste products. This can lead to health risks.  
6.5 Risk Assessment 
6.5.1 Risk Prioritisation 
6.5.1.1 Hierarchy Structure 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process was used to prioritise the risks in order of importance as perceived by 
key personnel at the company. The first part of the AHP technique is to structure the problem as a 
hierarchy: 
 
Figure 6-1: AHP hierarchy structure for prioritisation of risks 
 
The hierarchy shows that two criteria were selected, namely the risk impact and likelihood. The goal of 
the AHP is to obtain a prioritised list of risks which are evaluated against these criteria. 
 
Prioritized list 
of Risks
Impact Likelihood
Risk 1 Risk 2 ...... Risk N Risk 1 Risk 2 ...... Risk N
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6.5.1.2 Preference Encoding 
The next procedure is preference encoding of risks in Table 6-4. The preferences were encoded by 
asking the participants to score the risks based on the impact and likelihood. Appendix A depicts the 
questionnaire used for preference encoding. The preference encoding of the risks are performed for both 
impact and likelihood, which then yields two sets of preference ratings. Table 6-5 and Table 6-6 show 
the various responses in terms of risk impact and likelihood respectively. The preference rating for a risk 
was determined by multiplying the score weight by number of responses and summing these values. The 
formula is shown below: 
           ∑ 
 
 
    
               
                                             
An example for risk 1: the inhalation of chemicals is shown below: 
                                                    
 
Table 6-5: Preference encoding for risk impact 
ID Risk N.Resp 1 2 3 4 5 Preference Rating 
1 Inhalation of chemicals 14 3 1 4 5 1 42 
2 Cell phones and media Players 14 2 4 3 2 3 42 
3 Stacking and storing 14 1 3 1 2 7 53 
4 Repairing vehicle doors 11 0 4 3 3 1 34 
5 Contractor Control 14 1 3 5 3 2 44 
6 Abuse of assets  12 1 0 0 1 10 55 
7 Abuse of lifting equipment 14 2 2 4 4 2 44 
8 Equipment not working 14 0 0 5 4 5 56 
9 Materials handling 14 2 2 5 3 2 43 
10 Noise and dust 14 2 0 7 2 3 46 
11 Malfunctioning fire extinguishers 14 3 4 1 2 4 42 
12 Theft 14 0 2 0 4 8 6 
13 Staff not wearing PPE 14 2 4 1 3 4 5 
14 Procedural issues 14 2 1 4 5 2 46 
15 Removing vehicle wheels 11 2 2 1 4 2 35 
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Table 6-6: Preference encoding for risk likelihood 
ID Risk N.Resp 1 2 3 4 5 Preference Rating 
1 Inhalation of chemicals 14 2 4 4 3 1 39 
2 Cell phones and media Players 14 3 5 3 1 2 36 
3 Stacking and storing 14 1 0 9 2 2 46 
4 Repairing vehicle doors 11 1 6 3 1 0 26 
5 Contractor Control 14 1 3 6 1 3 44 
6 Abuse of assets  12 1 1 1 1 8 50 
7 Abuse of lifting equipment 14 3 3 4 3 1 38 
8 Equipment not working 14 0 1 6 4 3 51 
9 Materials handling 14 3 2 7 1 1 37 
10 Noise and dust 14 2 1 7 2 2 43 
11 Malfunctioning fire extinguishers 14 3 3 6 2 0 35 
12 Theft 14 0 4 1 4 5 52 
13 Staff not wearing PPE 14 3 4 4 1 2 37 
14 Procedural issues 14 0 7 4 2 1 39 
15 Removing vehicle wheels 11 3 3 3 1 1 27 
 
6.5.1.3 Priority Vectors and Consistency 
Following the encoding, the pairwise comparison matrix is formed. This matrix was then normalised and 
the priority weight vector was calculated. The priority weight contains the relative importance of risks. 
As the priority increases, the risk becomes more important.  
(i) Impact Priority Vector 
Table 6-7 contains priorities for the risks evaluated based on the impact criterion. The initial priorities 
have a Consistency Ratio (CR) = 10.71%. This is slightly larger than the acceptable value of 10%. While 
this value is probably sufficient to ensure consistency, the revision of judgements using the method 
proposed in section 4.1.1.2 was investigated. 
The adjusted priorities can be seen in the final column of Table 6-7 with CR = 8.01%, which is within 
the acceptable limits. 
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Table 6-7: Initial and adjusted priority vectors for risk impact 
Consistency Ratios (%) CR = 10.71 CR = 8.01 
ID Risk Initial 
Priority (%) 
Adjusted 
Priority (%) 
1 Inhalation of chemicals 4.36 4.44 
2 Cell phones and media Players 2.81 2.89 
3 Stacking and storing 8.23 8.79 
4 Repairing vehicle doors 2.28 2.32 
5 Contractor Control 7.78 7.01 
6 Abuse of assets 16.07 16.14 
7 Abuse of lifting equipment 3.91 3.99 
8 Equipment not working 13.70 14.14 
9 Materials handling 3.14 3.20 
10 Noise and dust 5.52 5.39 
11 Malfunctioning fire extinguishers 2.62 2.68 
12 Theft 19.19 18.38 
13 Staff not wearing PPE 4.20 4.29 
14 Procedural issues 5.02 5.11 
15 Removing vehicle wheels 1.18 1.22 
 
Figure 6-2 depicts the risk priorities evaluated on the impact criterion. From this figure it can clearly be 
seen that risk 6, risk 8 and risk 12 dominate the impact criterion priorities. This meant that, from the list 
of evaluated risks, participants perceived the abuse of assets, essential equipment not working and theft 
of assets/tools as the events which had the most significant effect on the company in terms of the impact 
criterion. 
 
Figure 6-2: Adjusted priority values for risk impact 
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(ii) Likelihood Priority Vector 
Next, the likelihood priorities are determined. The initial priorities show a CR = 10.44%. This is slightly 
larger than the acceptable value of 10%. The revision of judgements procedure is followed again 
resulting in adjusted priorities that can be seen in the final column of Table 6-8, with CR = 4.01% which 
is within the acceptable limits. 
Table 6-8: Initial and adjusted priority vectors for risk likelihood 
Consistency Ratios (%) CR = 10.44 CR = 4.07 
ID Risk Initial 
Priority (%) 
Adjusted 
Priority (%) 
1 Inhalation of chemicals 3.35 3.36 
2 Cell phones and media Players 2.61 2.61 
3 Incorrect stacking and storing 8.98 9.55 
4 Repairing vehicle doors 1.55 1.17 
5 Contractor Control 8.51 8.63 
6 Abuse of assets 15.31 15.80 
7 Abuse of lifting equipment 7.87 4.14 
8 Equipment not working 16.86 17.19 
9 Materials handling 3.51 3.52 
10 Noise and dust 6.75 6.69 
11 Malfunctioning fire extinguishers 2.24 2.31 
12 Theft 14.57 17.10 
13 Staff not wearing PPE 3.05 3.09 
14 Procedural issues 3.85 3.80 
15 Removing vehicle wheels 0.99 1.04 
 
Figure 6-3 depicts the priorities evaluated on the likelihood criterion. From this figure, it can clearly be 
seen that risk 6, risk 8 and risk 12 dominate the likelihood criterion priorities. This result is similar to the 
trend depicted in Figure 6-2. The priorities indicate that the abuse of assets, essential equipment not 
working and theft of assets/tools are the events that are most likely to occur. 
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Figure 6-3: Adjusted priority vector for risk likelihood 
Since risk 6, risk 8 and risk 12 exhibit the largest priorities with respect to both criteria, it can already be 
predicted that these risks will have the largest priorities with respect to the global priority vector, which 
1.18takes into account the relative importance of the criteria with respect to the goal. 
(iii)Global Priority 
The global priority is calculated according to the procedure in section 4.1.1.2. First, the matrix   is 
formed with columns equal to the adjusted impact and likelihood priority vectors from Table 6-7 and 
Table 6-8 respectively.  
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Next, the relative importance of criteria is arranged in a matrix         . When several criteria exist, the 
analytical hierarchy process must be followed to determine the importance of the criteria with respect to 
the goal. However, only two criteria exist in this case, namely the risk impact and likelihood. These 
criteria were assumed to have equivalent weight of 50%.  
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Thus: 
           {
  
  
} 
The global priority is then calculated by matrix multiplication of   and         . Table 6-9 shows the 
global priorities based on the adjusted priority vectors for impact, likelihood and          . 
Table 6-9: Global Priority Vector 
ID Risk Global Priority 
12 Theft  17.74 
6 Abuse of assets 15.97 
8 Equipment not working 15.67 
3 Incorrect stacking and storing practices 9.17 
5 Contractor control 7.82 
10 Excessive noise and dust / debris 6.04 
14 Procedural issues 4.45 
7 Abuse of lifting equipment 4.07 
1 Inhalation of chemicals 3.90 
13 Staff not wearing PPE 3.69 
9 Materials handling 3.36 
2 Cell phones and media players 2.75 
11 Malfunctioning fire extinguishers 2.50 
4 Repairing vehicle doors 1.75 
15 Removing vehicle wheels 1.13 
 
Table 6-9 shows that the participants in the risk management study perceived the theft of tools and other 
assets as the most threatening risk. This was closely followed by the abuse of assets and essential 
equipment not working.  
Considering the risks in Table 6-9, it was expected that risk 8, essential equipment not working, would 
have the largest priority since functional essential equipment is required to complete vital activities 
thereby achieving objectives. However, participants perceived theft of assets as a more threatening risk.  
This could be due to the fact that participants may have experienced theft personally at the company 
resulting in a wholly negative predisposition toward theft. If this is the case, it can be construed as 
motivational biases, in that a predisposition toward theft influenced the ratings. 
Since the questionnaire did not require the participants to specify the tools and/or assets that were stolen, 
it may happen that essential asset/tools were stolen, thus delaying work and reducing productivity. If 
essential equipment was being stolen, then the severity of risk is warranted. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
85 
Chapter 6 | Case Study: Discussion and Results 
One of the main functions of the company is the repair and maintenance and repair of said assets. Thus, 
the abuse of these assets by staff and contract workers negates this main function. For this reason, risk 6, 
the abuse of assets is the second most severe risk in Table 6-9. 
The initial and adjusted global priorities are shown in Figure 6-4. From this figure it can be seen that 
there is no significant change in global priorities due to revision of judgements. It was stated that since 
the consistency ratio was only slightly larger than 10%, the original solution would be sufficient. Thus 
Figure 6-4 validates this claim.  
 
 
Figure 6-4: Initial and adjusted global priorities 
 
6.5.1.4 Analytical Hierarchy Process Criteria Sensitivity Analysis 
The final step in the AHP is to determine the robustness of the solution. This is done according the 
method in section 4.1.1.2. First, the criteria weights in           were adjusted after which the global 
priority was recalculated. This procedure was followed for several variations in the criteria weights. The 
results are shown in Table 6-10:  
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Table 6-10: Analytical hierarchy process sensitivity analysis 
Prioritised list of Risks (Impact Weight %, Likelihood Weight %) 
ID Risk (50,50) (60,40) (70,30) (80,20) (40,60) (30,70) (20,80) 
Global Priority % 
12 Theft  16.88 17.34 17.80 18.26 16.41 15.95 15.49 
6 Abuse of assets  15.69 15.76 15.84 15.92 15.61 15.54 15.46 
8 Equipment not working 15.28 14.96 14.65 14.33 15.60 15.91 16.23 
3 stacking and storing  8.60 8.53 8.45 8.38 8.68 8.75 8.83 
5 Contractor control 8.15 8.07 8.00 7.93 8.22 8.29 8.36 
10 noise and dust 6.14 6.02 5.89 5.77 6.26 6.38 6.51 
14 Procedural issues 4.43 4.55 4.67 4.78 4.31 4.20 4.08 
7 Abuse of lifting equipment 5.89 5.49 5.09 4.70 6.28 6.68 7.08 
1 Inhalation of chemicals 3.86 3.96 4.06 4.16 3.75 3.65 3.55 
13 Staff not wearing PPE 3.63 3.74 3.86 3.97 3.51 3.40 3.28 
9 Materials handling 3.33 3.29 3.25 3.22 3.36 3.40 3.44 
2 Cell phones and media 
players 
2.71 2.73 2.75 2.77 2.69 2.67 2.65 
11 Malfunctioning fire 
extinguishers 
2.43 2.47 2.50 2.54 2.39 2.35 2.32 
4 Repairing vehicle doors 1.91 1.99 2.06 2.13 1.84 1.77 1.70 
15 Removing vehicle wheels 1.09 1.11 1.12 1.14 1.07 1.05 1.03 
 
The first column of global priorities represents the standard conditions, namely equivalent impact and 
priority criteria weight. Each successive column represents the risk priorities when the respective criteria 
have been altered to the percent values given in brackets.  
Table 6-10 shows that the solution is robust to changes in criteria weights. The risk rankings only 
change in the last two columns, and only among the top 3 risks. The remainder of the risks are not 
significantly influenced by changes in the impact or likelihood weighting.  
The robustness of the solution is due to the fact that participants scored, on average, the impact and 
likelihood of a specific risk with the same value, or only 1 point difference. For example, a risk given a 
4 impact score would either receive a 3, 4 or 5 likelihood rating.  
Further analysis revealed that, on average, the likelihood score would never be more than the impact 
score for a given risk (See Table 6-19 in section 6.5.4). This meant that if the impact was rated as 4, the 
likelihood would either be 4 or 3.  
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These results are a clear indication of bias (see section 3.2.2.2). Since questionnaires were completed 
anonymously, biases could not be detected beforehand and subsequently reduced. In order to continue 
with the analysis of the results, it is assumed that the data collected is acceptable. 
In spite of the presence of possible biases, a sensitivity analysis is presented next.  
In second to last column, which represents a 30% impact and 70% likelihood criteria weight, it can be 
seen that risk 8, essential equipment not working, becomes more important than risk 6, the abuse of 
assets. Thus, risk 6 moves down from the second to the third position in the priority rankings while risk 
8, essential equipment not working moves from up from the third to the second position. Risk 12, the 
theft of tools and assets, remains the most important risk. 
In the final column, which represents a 20% impact and 80% likelihood criteria weight, it can be seen 
that risk 8, essential equipment not working, becomes the most important risk, followed by theft and 
subsequently abuse of assets.  
Figure 6-5 is a graphical representation of the sensitivity of the top 3 risk events to changes in impact 
and likelihood criteria weight. The X-axis represents specific criteria weighting sets (See Table 6-11); 
the Y-axis represents the deviation from the standard value. 
 
Table 6-11: Criteria Weight set corresponding to Figure 6-5 
Criteria 
Weight set  
Impact, Likelihood 
1 (0.8,0.2) 
2 (0.7,03) 
3 (0.6,0.4) 
4 (standard) (0.5,0.5) 
5 (0.4,0.6) 
6 (0.3,0.7) 
7 (0.2,0.8) 
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Figure 6-5: Graphical representation of top 3 risks sensitivity 
 
The graph also shows that risk 6 is very stable with respect to deviation in any direction. Risk 8 and 12 
are more susceptible to change. 
Figure 6-5 shows more clearly that as the likelihood is increased (moving from set 4 to set 7), risk 6 and 
risk 12 deviate in the negative direction, that is, they become less important while risk 8 deviates in the 
positive direction, that is, becomes more important. This implies that risk 8 is more sensitive to changes 
in likelihood than risk 12 or risk 6.  
The susceptibility to changes in likelihood shows that the frequency with which essential equipment 
malfunctions is more important than the resulting impact it has on the company. This is intuitive because 
as the frequency of malfunctioning equipment increase, downtime increases and productivity decreases. 
It is also the case that frequently malfunctioning machinery are sources of frustration for individuals 
who cannot perform their duties as result.  
As the impact is increased, (moving from set 4 to set 1), risk 12 and risk 6 deviate in the positive 
direction, that is, becomes more important. The percentage deviation of risk 12 is larger than that of risk 
6, which demonstrates that it is more sensitive to an increase in the impact. Risk 8 deviates in the 
negative direction, becoming less important.  
From the sensitivity analysis, it can be said that losses associated with theft are more important than the 
frequency. The same conclusion can be applied to abuse of assets. In the case of essential equipment not 
working, the sensitivity analysis shows that the frequency is more important the impact. 
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6.5.2 Identifying Critical Risks 
6.5.2.1 RDM Questions 
The next procedure is the Risk Diagnosing Methodology or RDM. In this technique, the risks are 
designated as either critical or non-critical based on a series of questions relating to each risk (See 
section 4.1.2.1.). 
Twelve of the 17 risks identified in Table 6-3 were randomly chosen to perform the RDM methodology. 
It must be noted that while the AHP and RDM are usually performed sequentially, the methods are 
independent and can be completed separately. Thus, 12 risks were chosen at random for the RDM 
analysis. Some of the risks chosen for RDM appear in the AHP, so, these shared risks will be compared 
based on ranking to criticality. 
Table 6-12 gives the chosen list of risks as they appear in the RDM questionnaire. The risk ID 
corresponds to those indicated in Table 6-3. The completed risk profile can be seen in Table B-5 and 
Table B-6 in Appendix B. 
Risks were deliberately chosen at random, placed in a different order as well as worded differently when 
compared to the AHP questionnaire. This was done to reduce anchoring bias to the AHP questionnaire 
answers given, since the data requested by the AHP and RDM are similar. 
Table 6-12: Risk used in the RDM 
ID Risk 
7 Abuse / Improper use of lifting equipment resulting in injury 
6 Abuse of assets: vandalism and staff urinating in assets 
16 Staff aggression towards supervisors: Supervisors abused verbally or physically. 
9 Hazardous materials handling: improper handling of solvents causes chemical fire 
1 Inhalation of chemicals during paint stripping of components 
2 Staff member death/injury due to use of cell phones and media players 
3 Incorrect stacking and storing practices results in item falling from height injuring staff member. 
17 
Withdrawal of contract services due to non-payment: hazardous waste handling by staff 
13 Staff not wearing PPE results in injury 
15 Staff Injury: Removing and replacing vehicle wheels 
5 Contractor control: contractor creates risk situation resulting in injury 
4 Shock, falling, lacerations during repairing of vehicle doors 
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Table 6-13: Scores by participants for RDM Question 1 
RDM Question 1 
ID Risk Mean Deviation Median 
7 Abuse of lifting equipment 2.21 1.05 2.5 
6 Abuse of assets 3.92 1.16 4 
16 Staff aggression towards supervisors 3.21 1.31 3 
9 Materials handling 1.79 1.12 1.5 
1 Inhalation of chemicals 3.00 1.54 3.5 
2 Cell phones and media players 1.86 1.03 1.5 
3 stacking and storage 2.57 1.28 2 
17 Withdrawal of contract services  4.21 1.12 5 
13 staff not wearing PPE 2.36 1.28 2 
15 Removing vehicle wheels 1.91 0.83 2 
5 Contractor control 2.38 1.19 2 
4 Repairing vehicle doors 1.73 0.79 2 
 
Table 6-13 displays the mean and standard deviation of risks measured on the number of occurrences 
dimension. In Table 6-13 above, the higher the mean rating, the higher the risk. Table 6-13 also shows 
the standard deviation and the median. In cases where the mean is significantly greater than the median 
or where the standard deviation is greater than 1.5, a wide distribution of opinions exists. From Table 
6-13, it can be seen that no such cases occur thus yielding reliable results. 
Table 6-14: Scores by participants for RDM Question 2 
RDM Question 2 
ID Risk Mean Deviation Median 
7 Abuse of lifting equipment 1.62 0.96 1 
6 Abuse of assets 2.18 1.25 2 
16 Staff aggression towards supervisors 2.08 1.04 2 
9 Materials handling 2.54 0.97 3 
1 Inhalation of chemicals 1.55 0.93 1 
2 Cell phones and media players 2.31 1.25 2 
3 Stacking and storage 1.85 1.21 1 
17 Withdrawal of contract services  1.54 0.88 1 
13 Staff not wearing PPE 2.15 1.28 2 
15 Removing vehicle wheels 2.45 1.44 2 
5 Contractor control 2.77 1.48 2 
4 Repairing vehicle doors 2.45 1.29 2 
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Table 6-14 shows the risk measured on the level of control dimension. The risk events which 
participants perceived as difficult to control have a higher rating. A low mean rating implies that the risk 
can be controlled. The findings from Table 6-14 indicate all of the risks can be controlled to varying 
degrees. No mean values significantly greater than the median or standard deviations greater than 1.5 
was observed in Table 6-14 thus, the results are considered as reliable. 
Table 6-15: Scores by participants for RDM Question 3 
RDM Question 3 
ID Risk Mean Deviation Median 
7 Abuse of lifting equipment 4.23 1.01 5 
6 Abuse of assets 4.27 0.65 4 
16 Staff aggression towards supervisors 4.62 0.65 5 
9 Materials handling 3.77 1.09 3 
1 Inhalation of chemicals 4.55 0.69 5 
2 Cell phones and media players 4.23 1.01 5 
3 Stacking and storage 4.15 1.14 5 
17 Withdrawal of contract services  4.69 0.63 5 
13 Staff not wearing PPE 4.00 0.91 4 
15 Removing vehicle wheels 4.00 1.00 4 
5 Contractor control 3.77 1.24 4 
4 Repairing vehicle doors 4.00 1.10 4 
 
Table 6-15 presents the risks rated on the impact on objectives dimension. The results give the 
impression that the majority of the risks pose significant threat to the objectives of the company. If the 
objectives cannot be achieved, the enterprise cannot create value. However, results from Table 6-2 
indicated that the majority of the participants were not aware of the objectives of the enterprise or unit. 
If a participant is not aware of the objectives of the enterprise, then their ability to score the impact of 
risks on the objectives is questionable.  
The data, although slightly unreliable due the results in Table 6-2, is accepted as reliable in order to 
continue with the analysis. 
6.5.2.2 Risk Criticality 
Once the ratings for the risks are obtained, the risk profile is built, Table B-5 and Table B-6 in Appendix 
B presents the risk profile. Following the rules for risk diagnosing in section 4.1.2.1, risk criticality is 
determined from the risk profile. Table 6-16 shows the criticality of the risks assessed using RDM.  
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Table 6-16: Risk Criticality based on the risk diagnosing methodology 
ID Risk Category Criticality 
7 Abuse of lifting equipment L Non-Critical 
6 Abuse of assets H – F  Critical 
16 Staff aggression towards supervisors L – H  Critical 
9 Materials handling S – H  Critical 
1 Inhalation of chemicals L – H  Critical 
2 Cell phones and media players L Non-Critical 
3 Stacking and storage L – H  Critical 
17 Withdrawal of contract services  M Non-Critical 
13 Staff not wearing PPE L – F  Critical 
15 Removing vehicle wheels L – M  Non-Critical 
5 Contractor control S – F  Critical 
4 Repairing vehicle doors L – M  Non-Critical 
 
In the Table 6-16, S = safe, L = low, H = high and F = fatal. 
A risk categorised higher than medium is considered to be critical. When a risk is categorised with a 
distribution such as L – H, the company should plan for the undesirable case. Thus, L – H becomes H 
and the associated risk is considered to be critical. 
Moreover, distributions give an indication of the level of agreement. For wide distributions, the level of 
agreement is very low. This has an implication on the cost of risk controls. Since the company is advised 
to plan for the undesirable case, a risk categorised as S – F would have to be controlled based on the F 
category. It is cost effective to investigate the lack of consensus and reduce the spread of opinions such 
that the risk can be categorised using a single category. 
6.5.2.3 Overall Enterprise Risk 
The RDM was also used to determine overall enterprise risk. Following the procedure in section 4.1.2.2, 
the overall risk for the pessimistic case (when distributions are assumed to be in the undesirable 
category), and the optimistic case (distributions are assumed to be in the desirable category) can be 
calculated. Table 6-17 below shows the weighting assigned to the various risk categories.  
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Table 6-17: RDM risk category weighting 
Risk Category Category 
Weighting 
F (Fatal Risk) 4 
H (High Risk) 3 
M (Medium Risk) 2 
L ( Low Risk) 1 
S ( Safe Risk) 0 
 
Figure 6-6 below, is the overall enterprise risk based on a 0 to 100% scale. In this figure, 100% 
represents the case when all the risks are fatal and 0% indicates that all the risks are safe.  
 
 
Figure 6-6: Overall Enterprise Risk 
Figure 6-6 shows that the optimistic case is situated at approximately 27% of the total risk, between low 
and medium risk. The pessimistic case lies between the medium and high at approximately 65%. The 
dispersion by lack of consensus is the vertical distance between these points, which is approximately 
38%.  
The dispersion indicates that every evaluation of risk is at least 62% reliable. While this is acceptable, 
the company should strive towards a minimum reliability of at least 80%. This can be achieved by 
increasing awareness about the risks in the company.  
Interpreted differently, it can be said that any evaluation of risk may have a deviation of at most 38%. 
Figure 6-6 also shows that on average, risks will be found within the pessimistic and optimistic region. 
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6.5.3 Risk Diagnoses Compared to Risk Priority 
Table 6-18 shows the risks that were common to both the RDM and AHP. The risks are arranged in 
order of importance as determined by the AHP methodology. The risk category and resultant criticality 
are listed. 
Table 6-18: Risk criticality compared to risk priority. 
Risk ID AHP ranked list RDM Category Criticality 
6 Abuse of Assets H-F Critical 
3 Stacking and Storing Practices L-H Critical 
5 Contractor Control S-F Critical 
7 Abuse of Lifting Equipment L Non-Critical 
1 Inhalation of Chemicals L-H Critical 
13 Staff Not Wearing PPE L-F Critical 
9 Materials handling S-H Critical 
2 Cell phones and Media Players L Non-Critical 
4 Repairing Vehicle Doors L-M Non-Critical 
15 Removing Vehicle Wheels L-M Non-Critical 
 
The results show that, the risk priority is not sufficient to establish whether qualitative or quantitative 
analysis is required. Table 6-18 shows the list of risks in order of importance based on AHP results. The 
list shows that the top three risks are all critical. However, the fourth risk is non-critical even though it 
has been ranked as more important than other critical risks.  
This is due to the fact that RDM takes into account the level of control over the risk. Well understood 
risks are usually easier to control and thus non-critical. This is the case with the fourth highest risk in 
Table 6-18. 
6.5.4 Risk Impact and Likelihood: Qualitative Technique 
The qualitative assessment of the risks was performed using the risk impact and likelihood questionnaire 
in Appendix A. Since qualitative analysis is performed quickly and with little difficulty, the risks shown 
in Table 6-19 were evaluated regardless of criticality. This will also serve to emphasise the amount of 
time and effort required for qualitative assessment as opposed to quantitative. The average impact and 
likelihood as well as the standard deviation were calculated as shown in Table 6-19. A standard 
deviation greater than 1.5 indicates a lack of consensus. 
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Table 6-19: Qualitative assessment of risk impact and likelihood 
ID Risk Impact Likelihood St. Dev (Impact) St. Dev. (likelihood) 
1 Inhalation of chemicals 3 3 1.30 1.19 
2 Cell phones and media Players 3 3 1.41 1.34 
3 Incorrect stacking and storing practices 4 4 1.48 0.99 
4 Repairing vehicle doors 4 3 1.04 0.81 
5 Contractor control 4 4 1.17 1.23 
6 Abuse of assets 5 5 1.16 1.40 
7 Abuse of lifting equipment 4 3 1.29 1.27 
8 Equipment not working 4 4 0.88 0.93 
9 Materials handling 4 3 1.27 1.15 
10 Noise and dust  4 4 1.27 1.21 
11 Malfunctioning fire extinguishers 3 3 1.62 1.02 
12 Theft 5 4 1.07 1.27 
13 Staff not wearing PPE 4 3 1.53 1.34 
14 Procedural issues 4 3 1.27 0.97 
15 Removing vehicle wheels 4 3 1.47 1.29 
 
The following risks were identified as having an impact with a standard deviation larger than 1.5: 
 Risk 13: Staff not wearing PPE 
 Risk 11: Malfunctioning fire extinguishers 
Broken fire extinguishers was a risk event obtained from the incidents reports and thus had not yet been 
included in the formal risk management processes at the company. Thus, all the participants might not 
have been aware of this risk event prior to the evaluation process. 
Staff not wearing PPE was not associated with a specific activity in the risk questionnaire. It was meant 
to be a general question as it was noticed that many of the risk events arise due to staff not wearing PPE. 
This may have been a vague question as the impact of not wearing PPE can vary depending on the task. 
None of the risks evaluated on the likelihood dimension displayed a standard deviation greater than 1.5. 
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6.5.5 Risk Impact and Likelihood: Quantitative Technique 
3 critical risks were chosen from Table 6-18. These were: 
 Inhalation of chemicals 
 Stacking and storing practices 
 Contractor control 
6.5.5.1 Risk Ratings and information from the company data 
The data provided in this section will be used in subsequent quantitative assessment procedures. The risk 
register provided by the company gave the following ratings for the critical risks: 
Table 6-20: Company risk ratings before mitigation 
ID Risk  Impact Likelihood Exposure 
1 Inhalation of chemicals 2 4 6 
3 Stacking and storage practices 3 3 6 
5 Contractor control 5 5 5 
 
From the Table 6-20, it can be seen that the company evaluated the risk based on a third parameter, 
exposure. Exposure is how often the employees perform the task that exposes them to the risk. The tasks 
associated with each risk can be seen in Table 6-3. An interpretation of the exposure values is shown in 
Table 6-21. 
Table 6-21: Exposure values interpretation from company data 
Weight Interpretation 
1 Remotely possible 
2 Sometimes 
3 Once per month 
4 Once per week 
5 Once per day 
6 Continuous; daily 
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The company impact ratings in Table 6-20 are associated with specific costs. These costs are 
summarised in Table 6-22: 
Table 6-22: Impact weight description and associated cost from company data 
Weight description Cost ( R ) 
1 Minor injury > 1000 
2 Temporary injury > 10 000 
3 Serious injury > 100 000 
4 One fatality > 500 000 
5 Several fatalities > 1 000 000 
6 Many fatalities > 10 000 000 
 
The company also provide a list of risk control strategies as well as the risk rating after the controls were 
implemented.  
Table 6-23: Company risk controls and ratings after mitigation 
ID Risk Controls Impact Likelihood Exposure 
1 Layer of water to cover the stripping chemicals 1 1 5 
3 Training of staff; supervision by warehouse supervisor 1 2 6 
5 Project meetings; Service Level Agreements 2 3 5 
 
Table 6-3 shows that each risk is associated with an activity. For the inhalation of chemicals, the activity 
is cleaning of components with solvent. The risks event and control thereof associated with the activities 
are as follows: 
The residue from the solvent used, drips onto the ground during the cleaning process. This residue is 
volatile and evaporates readily. The fumes are then inhaled by the worker. The chosen risk control is to 
cover the residue with a layer of water drastically reducing the evaporation rate.  
For stacking and storing practices, the activity is improper stacking and storing of materials which then 
fall from height and injure personnel. The mitigation strategy is the training of personnel in proper 
stacking and storing practices as well supervision by a storage manager. 
For contractor control, the activity is contractors engaging in unsafe and hazardous behaviour due to 
lack of knowledge about risks or disregard for safety procedures. The resulting mitigation is to conduct 
meetings with the contractors to establish service level agreements. Service level agreement sets the 
standard to which contractors will be held.  
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6.5.5.2 Risk Impact based on Quantitative Techniques 
Quantifying the risk impact using the method in section 4.1.3.4 requires a sufficient amount data that is 
reliable. The company was unable to provide the data, thus the expert opinion methodology for 
estimating the risk impact distribution was used (See section 4.1.3.5). 
Using expert opinion, an optimistic, pessimistic and most likely cost of the risk is required to perform 
the analysis. These values were obtained from the data provided by the company in section 6.5.5.1. First, 
the optimistic cost was obtained by looking at the impact weighting assigned to the risks after mitigation 
in Table 6-23. This impact rating was then used to find the corresponding cost in Table 6-22. The 
pessimistic value was obtained by looking at the risk impact before mitigation in Table 6-20 and finding 
the corresponding cost in Table 6-22. 
Accurate values for the most likely cost could not be obtained from the company. Thus it was assumed 
to be approximately 15% to 40% of the pessimistic cost. This assumption is only made due to a lack of 
data. The main research goal of this study is not to perform a risk assessment for company but partly, to 
show that quantitative risk management can be performed without being overly complex.  
Table 6-24 was set up based on the company data and assumptions. Here,   represents the optimistic 
cost,   is the pessimistic cost and   is the most likely cost. The mean and standard deviation were 
calculated using the formulas in section 4.1.3.5. The beta distribution shape parameters,   and  , are 
then calculated using the equations in section 4.1.3.4. 
Table 6-24: Beta and PERT parameters for the impact of critical risks 
Parameters Inhalation of 
chemicals 
Stacking and 
storing 
Contractor 
Control 
   R 1 000 R 10 000 R 10 000 
   R 4 000 R 35 000 R 150 000 
   R 10 000 R 100 000 R 1 000 000 
mean R 4 500 R 41 667 R 268 333 
St. Dev. R 1 500 R 15 000 R 165 000 
   3.951 3.749 3.229 
   4.938 5.053 5.257 
 
Monte Carlo Simulation was used to generate the beta distribution estimation for the risk impact. Ten 
thousand simulations were conducted for each of critical risk in Table 6-24 using BETA.INV function in 
EXCEL.  
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Figure 6-7: BETA.INV function in Microsoft Excel for impact distribution 
 The probability box is a random probability value generated at each simulation run using the 
Monte Carlo Software.  
 The alpha and beta are the respective distribution shape parameters. 
 A and B are the upper and lower bounds, which correspond to the pessimistic and optimistic 
cost estimation respectively.  
 
Following the estimation of impact values, the frequency plots are generated using the procedure in 
section 4.1.3.4. Table 6-25 shows the bins and frequency for the estimated risk impact values with 
respect to the inhalation of chemicals. Figure 6-8 is a histogram of the frequency data. 
Table 6-25: Frequency for impact distribution of inhalation of chemicals 
class bins Frequency 
1 1074 – 1617 1 
2 1618 – 2161 12 
3 2162 – 2705 147 
4 2706 – 3249 377 
5 3250 – 3793 706 
6 3794 – 4337 1001 
7 4338 – 4881 1258 
8 4882 – 5425 1343 
9 5426 – 5969 1373 
10 5970 – 6513 1287 
11 6514 – 7057 973 
12 7058 – 7601 701 
13 7602 – 8145 440 
14 8146 – 8689 256 
15 8690 – 9233 103 
16 9234 + 22 
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Figure 6-8: Frequency Plot for inhalation of chemicals impact 
Figure 6-8 indicates that the most probable impact will occur at either class 8 or class 9. This 
corresponds to the bins 4882 – 5424 and 5426 – 5969 respectively. Considering the lower limit of class 
8 and the upper limit of class 9, it can be deduced that whenever the risk event inhalation of chemicals 
occurs, it will cost the company approximately R 4 880 to R 5 969. Injury due to incorrect stacking and 
storing may cost the company anywhere between R 44 081 and R 54 676. Unsafe behaviour by 
contractors can potentially cost the company between R 387 962 and R 509 805 per incident.  
6.5.5.3 Risk Likelihood based on Quantitative Techniques  
Each of the critical risks chosen for quantitative analysis exhibit the characteristics of an activity 
described in section 4.1.3.6. Thus, the quantitative method for estimating risk likelihood can be used. 
This method requires an estimate of the number of times an activity is completed in given time period, 
the number of allowable successes and the number of allowable failures. Here, success is completing the 
activity without the risk occurring and a failure is noted when the risk occurs while performing the 
activity. 
The company was unable to provide reliable estimates for the required parameters. Thus, the number of 
repetitions is assumed based on the exposure rating prior to mitigation (See Table 6-20), and the number 
of failures are assumed based on the nature of the activity. The assumptions are as follows: 
The inhalation of chemicals is associated with paint stripping of components. The exposure for this risk 
is continuous, daily. It was assumed that on any given day, the number of times the activity is completed 
is 60. The tolerance for health risk such as the inhalation of chemicals should be very low thus, it was 
assumed that number of failures is 10. The number of successes is then 50. 
Stacking and Storing is associated with improper storage of components. The exposure for this risk was 
continuous, daily. It was assumed that on any given day 100 components are stored in designated 
storage areas. The number of tolerable failures was assumed to be 25. The number of successes is then 
75. 
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Contractor control is associated with contract workers performing various activities at the company. The 
exposure for this risk was once per day. It was assumed that collectively, contractors perform 
approximately 50 different tasks per day. Since the contractors are not directly under the control of the 
company, the tolerable failures is assumed to be 20. The number of successes is then 30. 
Table 6-26: Beta distribution parameters for the likelihood of critical risks 
Beta distribution Parameters Inhalation of 
chemicals 
Stacking and 
storing 
Contractor 
Control 
Number of Repetitions 60 100 50 
Successes 50 75 30 
Failures 10 25 20 
Probability of observing the given 
number of failures and successes 
Randomly generated value 
 
For risk likelihood, the probability of observing the given number of successes and failures is required. 
This parameter is inherently unknown and thus will be generated at each Monte Carlo Simulation run. 
Ten thousand Monte Carlo simulations were conducted to estimate the likelihood distribution of the 
critical risks. 
 
Figure 6-9: BETA.INV function in Microsoft Excel for likelihood distribution 
 The probability box is a random probability value generated at each simulation run using the 
Monte Carlo Software. In this case, the random value is the probability of observing the 
assumed number of successes and failures for the activity.  
 The alpha and beta are distribution shape parameters. The alpha value is the number of 
successes and the beta value is the number of failures. 
 The risk likelihood is bounded by the domain [0 ; 1]. Thus, A and B values are 0 and 1 
respectively. 
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Based on these values, a probability of success (  ) is calculated for each simulation. The risk likelihood 
is then     . At the end of the process, 10 000 risk likelihood values are estimated. Following the 
estimation of risk likelihood values, the frequency plots are generated. Table 6-27 shows the frequency 
values for the inhalation of chemicals risk. 
Table 6-27: Frequency for likelihood distribution of inhalation of chemicals 
class bins Frequency 
1 0.0355 – 0.0585 1 
2 0.0586 – 0.0816 19 
3 0.0817 – 0.1047 217 
4 0.1048 – 0.1278 657 
5 0.1279 – 0.1509 1334 
6 0.1510 – 0.1740 1728 
7 0.1741 – 0.1971 1898 
8 0.1972 – 0.2202 1641 
9 0.2203 – 0.2433 1133 
10 0.2434 – 0.2664 683 
11 0.2665 – 0.2895 419 
12 0.2896 – 0.3126 154 
13 0.3127 – 0.3357 76 
14 0.3358 – 0.3588 32 
15 0.3589 – 0.3819 4 
16 0.3820 + 4 
 
 
Figure 6-10: Frequency Plot for inhalation of chemicals likelihood 
Figure 6-10 indicates that the most probable likelihood will occur at either class 6 or class 7. This 
corresponds to the bins 0.1510 – 0.1740 and 0.1741 – 0.1971 respectively. Consider the lower limit of 
class 6 and the upper limit of class 7. Thus, each time paint stripping of components is performed, the 
likelihood of inhaling chemicals is approximately 15.1 to 19.71%.  
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Fr
e
q
u
e
n
cy
 
Class/ Bin 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
103 
Chapter 6 | Case Study: Discussion and Results 
Figure C-3 showed that each time an item is stacked incorrectly, the likelihood of injury when it falls 
can range between 24.5 and 28.9%. Figure C-4 showed that each time a contractor performs an activity, 
the likelihood of a risk situation being created is approximately 40.7 to 47.6%. 
It was stated that if an activity cannot be classified using the guidelines in section 4.1.3.6, the following 
options are available. 
 Option 1: Use the impact distribution to obtain a point estimate for likelihood. 
 Option 2: Use expert judgement to obtain a point estimate for the probability. 
 Option 3: Use qualitative analysis for the impact and likelihood. 
Assuming that the activities could not be classified using the guidelines, option 1 is demonstrated. From 
Table 6-25, it can be seen that each class is associated with a frequency or number of observations for 
risk impact. It is then proposed that the most probable impact is located within the range of the top 2 
classes. The probability of observing an impact, or risk likelihood in that range of the bins, can be 
calculated as: 
                 
∑                        
                                           
 
The values in Table 6-28 are the number of observations in the top 2 classes for the inhalation of 
chemicals risk.  
Table 6-28: Top 2 classes for inhalation of chemicals 
class bins Frequency 
8 4882 – 5425 1343 
9 5426 – 5969 1373 
 
The total number of impact observations generated using Monte Carlo simulation was 10 000. Thus, risk 
likelihood can be calculated as: 
                 
         
      
        
Thus, for inhalation of chemicals, a risk likelihood of 27.16% is observed for an impact occurring in the 
range R 4 882 to R 5 969. Following the same procedure for the other risks, stacking and storing showed 
a likelihood of 26.6% with an impact range of R 44 081 to R 54 676. Contractor control showed a 
likelihood of 27.9% with impact ranging from R 387 962 to R 509 805. 
The likelihood values calculated are almost identical. This is due the fact that the PERT method was 
used to determine impact distribution mean and standard deviation. The PERT method will always result 
in a near symmetrical beta distribution yielding similar estimations for the risk likelihood. If empirical 
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data was used to model risk impact, the probability distribution would depend on the spread of the data, 
yielding variable likelihood estimations. 
Table 6-29 shows the comparison of the beta distribution likelihood estimation against the likelihood 
estimation using option 1 alternative. 
Table 6-29: Comparison of likelihood estimates 
Risk Beta Distribution 
likelihood estimate 
Option 1 
likelihood estimate 
Inhalation of Chemicals 15.1 – 19.71 %  27.16% 
Stacking and storing 24.5 – 28.9% 26.6% 
Contractor control 40.7 – 47.6% 27.9% 
 
6.5.6 Expected Losses  
The impact and likelihood distributions were then used to calculate the expected losses. The expected 
loss is analogous to the risk threat level used in qualitative analysis. Expected losses are calculated as: 
                                 
Section 5.1.2 defines the different expected losses. The unacceptable expected loss    is the expected 
loss before mitigation. The acceptable expected loss    is the expected loss after risk mitigation controls 
have been applied. The unacceptable expected losses were calculated for the critical risk. Since 10 000 
impact and likelihood values were estimated using Monte Carlo simulation, 10 000    values were 
calculated. Next, the    frequency plot was generated for each of the critical risks evaluated.  
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6.5.6.1 Inhalation of Chemicals 
 
 
Figure 6-11: Inhalation of chemicals frequency distribution for R1 
Figure 6-11 shows the frequency plot for expected losses with respect to inhalation of chemicals. The 
bins corresponding to the classes can be found in Table C-1 in Appendix C. The graph shows that the 
most probable    value will be found in either class 4 or 5. This corresponds to an unacceptable 
expected loss of approximately R 612.7 to R 964.6.  
 
 
Figure 6-12: Inhalation of chemicals cumulative probability distribution 
The cumulative probability distribution was obtained from the frequency which was used in section 6.6 
to determine risk response strategy. Appendix C gives the cumulative plots for the other critical risks. 
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6.5.6.2 Stacking and Storing Practices 
 
 
Figure 6-13: Stacking and storing frequency distribution for R1 
Figure 6-13 shows the frequency plot for expected losses with respect to stack and storing practices. The 
bins corresponding to the classes can be found in Table C-1 in Appendix C. The graph shows the most 
probable    value will be found in either class 6 or 7. This corresponds to an unacceptable expected loss 
of approximately R 11 949 to R 15 900.  
6.5.6.3 Contractor Control 
 
 
Figure 6-14: Contractor control frequency distribution for R1 
Figure 6-14 shows the frequency plot for expected losses with respect to contractor control. The bins 
corresponding to the classes can be found in Table C-1 in Appendix C. The graph shows the most 
probable    value will be found in either class 5 or 6. This corresponds to an unacceptable expected loss 
of approximately R 134 852 to R 198 894.  
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6.6 Risk Response Choices 
6.6.1 Risk Response Choice: Qualitative Technique 
Section 6.5.4 presented the risk impact and likelihood evaluated using qualitative techniques. The results 
of the qualitative impact and probability estimation are then arranged in a risk matrix shown in Figure 
6-15 below. The numbers within the matrix represent the risk ID from Table 6-19 
 
 
Figure 6-15: Completed Risk matrix 
The description of the various colour coded regions can be seen in Table 6-30 below. 
Table 6-30: Description of regions in the risk matrix 
Classification Response action 
Safe ACCEPT 
Low REDUCE/SHARE 
Medium REDUCE/SHARE 
High AVOID 
 
It follows that; any risks in the green area should be accepted as the cost of doing business. Risks in the 
yellow area and orange area should be reduced or shared. Risks in the red area should be avoided. 
Sharing and reducing the risk are not mutually exclusive. This means that the company can take both 
actions simultaneously if that option is available. Table 6-31 shows the suggested response actions for 
risks based on qualitative assessment techniques. 
 
5 12 6
4
4, 7, 9, 
13, 14, 
15
3, 5, 8, 
10
3 1, 2, 11
2
1
1 2 3 4 5
High
Low High
Probability / Likelihood
Risk Threat Level = Probability x Impact 
Im
p
a
c
t
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
108 
Chapter 6 | Case Study: Discussion and Results 
Table 6-31: Suggested risk response actions based on Figure 6-15 
ID Risk Severity Response 
1 Inhalation of chemicals 9 reduce/share 
2 Cell phones and media Players 9 reduce/share 
3 Incorrect stacking and storing practices 16 avoid 
4 Repairing vehicle doors 12 reduce/share 
5 Contractor control 16 avoid 
6 Abuse of assets 25 avoid 
7 Abuse of lifting equipment 12 reduce/share 
8 Equipment not working 16 avoid 
9 Materials handling 12 reduce/share 
10 Noise and dust 16 avoid 
11 Malfunctioning fire extinguishers 9 reduce/share 
12 Theft 20 avoid 
13 Staff not wearing PPE 12 reduce/share 
14 Procedural issues 12 reduce/share 
15 Removing vehicle wheels 12 reduce/share 
 
Qualitative risk response methods are typically used when the risks are non-critical. However, all the 
risks shown in Table 6-19 were evaluated regardless of the criticality. This was done to demonstrate the 
simplicity of selecting a risk response using qualitative as opposed to quantitative techniques. 
6.6.2 Risk Response Choice: Quantitative Technique 
The risk response strategy choice based on quantitative techniques is shown in this section. This 
methodology requires the following variables: 
 A point estimate for   , the unacceptable expected loss. 
  , the ratio of    to    
 A point estimate for   , the acceptable expected loss 
  , the irremovable uncertainty 
  , the unit prevention cost 
  , the insurance rate 
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6.6.2.1 A Point Estimate for R1, the Unacceptable Expected Loss 
It is noted that reducing the probability distribution of    to a point estimate significantly reduces the 
information regarding parameter and how it affects the company. Unfortunately, it is a necessity when 
using this methodology.  
The point estimate for    is chosen using the cumulative probability distribution in Figure 6-12, Figure 
C-5 and Figure C-6. When the cumulative probability reaches 50%, the associated class number is read 
from the graph. Each class number corresponds to a specific cost range in the    frequency tables (see 
Table C-1 in Appendix C). The middle value in this range is chosen as the point estimate for  .  
It must be noted that companies can increase the effectiveness of risk mitigation by selecting a higher 
cumulative probability as this will cover more of expected losses. However, this will yield a higher 
value for    and a consequentially higher mitigation cost.  
For the inhalation of chemicals, class number 5 is associated with a cumulative probability of 50%. This 
corresponds to an unacceptable expected loss in the range R 788.7 to R 963.7. The middle of this range 
yields the    point estimate of R 876.  
Following the same procedure the other risks, it was noted that stacking and storing had an unacceptable 
loss of R 12 937 and contractor control had an unacceptable loss of R 150 862. 
6.6.2.2 The R1 to R2 Ratio 
The ratio can be calculated using qualitative impact and likelihood judgements provided by the company 
in Table 6-20 and Table 6-23. Any expected loss is a product of impact and probability. Thus, for 
inhalation of chemicals:  
             
             
Here,    is considered to be the product of the impact and probability ratings after mitigation (See Table 
6-23).    is the product of the impact and probability ratings before mitigation (See Table 6-20). Thus, 
   
  
  
  
 
 
        
Following the same procedure for the risks, it was found that φ = 0.22 for stacking and storing and φ = 
0.24 for contractor control. 
6.6.2.3 A Point Estimate for R2, the Acceptable Expected Loss 
It is assumed that the calculated ratio, φ, applies to quantitative data. Therefore,    for inhalation of 
chemicals is: 
                       
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
110 
Chapter 6 | Case Study: Discussion and Results 
Thus            
Following this procedure for stacking and storing and contactor control, we find that             and 
              respectively. 
6.6.2.4 The Unit Prevention Cost, k 
The unit prevention cost is a measure of the difficulty to control the risk, and is usually estimated by 
expert opinion. However, the company was unable to provide a value for  . Based on the risk controls in 
Table 6-23, values for   were assumed.  
Consider the inhalation of chemicals. Table 6-23 shows that the risk control is simply adding a layer of 
water over the chemical residue to prevent evaporation. Due to the simplicity of this solution,   was 
chosen as R 50.  
For the stacking and storing procedures, the controls are training staff and employing warehouse 
manager. This is slightly more difficult, thus,   was allocated a value of R 150.  
Contractor control mitigation involves project meetings with the contracting company wherein 
negotiation of new contracts and service level agreements are made. Since the contractors are not 
explicitly within the control of the company, and that difficulties can often arise in contract negotiation 
and service levels agreements, a value of R 350 was chosen for  . 
6.6.2.5 The Irremovable Uncertainty, ω 
Question 2 of the risk diagnosing methodology required participants to score the risk based on a 
controllability dimension. A score of 1 indicated total control whereas a score of 5 indicated no control. 
The values for the irremovable uncertainty  are analogous to the RDM score for question 2. 
Table 6-32 RDM Score compared to irremovable uncertainty 
RDM  
Score 
ω 
1 0 
2 0.25 
3 0.5 
4 0.75 
5 1 
 
Using regression analysis the following formula was obtained for : 
                             
Table 6-33 shows the calculated values for . 
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6.6.2.6 The Interest Rate, r 
The company was unable to provide information in this regard. Thus the interest rate was assumed to be 
5% for all risks. 
Table 6-33: Quantitative risk response methodology requirements 
Variable Description 
Inhalation of 
chemicals 
Stacking 
and storing 
Contractor 
Control 
  Irremovable uncertainty 0.14 0.21 0.44 
     to    ratio 0.125 0.22 0.24 
   
Unacceptable expected 
loss 
R 877 R 12 937 R 150 863 
   Acceptable expected loss R 110 R 2 875 R 36 207 
  Unit prevention cost R 50 R 150 R 300 
  Interest rate 5% 5% 5% 
   
 
 Enterprise characteristics 0.11 0.958 6.035 
 
6.6.2.7 Risk Responses 
The rule of thumb in guidelines in Table 5-3 is used to determine the risk responses based on the 
enterprise and level of control.  
Table 6-34: Risk Responses based on rules of thumb 
Risk 
   
 
    Response 
Inhalation of Chemicals 0.110 0.54 Adaptation 
Stacking and Storing 
Practices 
0.958 0.84 Unclear, use Figure 
6-16 
Contactor Control 6.035 2.215 Unclear, use Figure 
6-17 
 
Table 6-34 shows that the response strategy for the inhalation of chemicals can be chosen using the rules 
of thumb. The graph of  
   
 
     must be plotted in order to determine the response strategy for the 
other risks. 
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(i) Inhalation of Chemicals Risk Response 
Table 6-34 shows that the company should adapt to the inhalation of chemicals risk rather than trying to 
prevent it. This result is counter-intuitive because a company should always attempt to prevent health 
risks first.  
Since the model evaluates the cost of preventing the risk against the cost of adapting to the risk, a low 
adaptation cost increases the preference towards adaptation. In the case of inhalation of chemicals, the 
small    value resulted in very low adaptation costs. Thus, adaptation became the preferred strategy. 
This result was foreseeable as the model development does not account for ethical considerations in risk 
response. Prevention should always be considered when the health and safety of workers are at risk. 
(ii) Stacking and Storing Risk Response 
 
 
Figure 6-16: Risk Response Strategy for Stacking and Storing 
Figure 6-16 was used to determine the preferred risk response strategy for stacking and storing. From 
Table 6-33 , it can be seen that 
   
 
         and        . Thus, the optimum response (the green 
dot) is located in the adaptation region. 
This meant that the company should rather implement insurance to cover possible losses instead of 
training and supervising employees with respect to correct stacking and storing procedures. 
Since stacking and storing is a safety risk, ethical considerations must be taken into account when 
selecting a risk response strategy. These ethical considerations should always outweigh the monetary 
costs involved. Thus, a preventative or a mixed strategy should be used to mitigate effects of incorrect 
staking and storing practices.  
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
En
te
rp
ri
se
 C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
ω  
Prevention 
Mixed Strategy 
Adaptation 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
113 
Chapter 6 | Case Study: Discussion and Results 
(iii)Contractor Control 
 
 
Figure 6-17: Risk Response Strategy for contractor control 
 
Figure 6-17 shows the graph of  
   
 
     for the contractor control risk. From Table 6-33, it can be seen 
that 
   
 
         and         . Thus, the optimum response (the green dot) is located in the mixed 
strategy region. 
This result indicated that the company should implement preventative measures such as re-negotiation 
of service level agreements but also insure for any losses that may occur. Such a strategy agrees with 
ethical considerations since prevention is included in the response strategy.  
The contingency plan is to insure for any losses that may occur. This is necessary because the company 
does not have direct control over the contract workers. The company relies on service levels agreed 
upon in negotiations with contractors to mitigate the risk. The partial lack of control is validated by the 
large irremovable uncertainty        .  
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6.6.3 Responses Accounting for Ethical Considerations  
The final risk response strategies taking into account the model prediction and ethical considerations is 
shown in Table 6-35. 
Table 6-35: Risk response strategies accounting for ethical considerations 
Risk Response 
Inhalation of Chemicals Prevention 
Stacking and Storing 
Practices 
Prevention 
Contactor Control Mixed Strategy 
 
The model was unable to account for ethical considerations in risk response. For this reason, the 
prediction of the model should not be regarded as the best possible solution. When ethical considerations 
are not a factor, the model produces reliable results. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the results arising from implementation of the framework in case study. 
This chapter presents the general overview of the proposed framework and the achievement of the 
research goal. Lastly, recommendations are made for future studies. 
 
7.2 Conclusions 
 The case study has shown that the core risk management functions, which are necessary in any 
ERM process, have been successfully encompassed in this framework. These are risk 
identification, response and assessment.  
 Typical risk management literature presents qualitative or quantitative methods in isolation. This 
study has shown that both quantitative and qualitative techniques can be successfully 
incorporated into a single, comprehensive risk management framework.  
 The methods presented have shown that such a framework can be largely practical. Furthermore, 
each process in the framework has been integrated in a logical and systematic nature. 
 All Calculations, including the Monte Carlo Simulation were performed using Microsoft 
EXCEL, making implementation of the framework computationally possible without the use of 
complex programs. 
 The proposed framework was able to identify when quantitative analysis is necessary and when 
qualitative analysis is sufficient. Since quantitative analysis can become complex and time 
consuming, this distinction is essential to maintaining the practicality of the framework. 
 The results show that expert judgement can be used effectively when empirical data is sparse. 
Alternatives to empirical data are essential in risk management as data is seldom readily 
available. 
 The results of the case study has shown that the framework is able to identify the level of 
understanding of risk management, the perception of risk management and cultural attributes 
within an enterprise which affect the risk management process. 
 This study has shown that risk management does not have to overly simple to be implemented, 
or overly complex to be effective. 
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7.3 Achievement of Research Goal 
The main research goal of the study was to develop a practical, systematic enterprise risk management 
framework that incorporates both qualitative and quantitative risk management techniques. An analysis 
of practicality and systematic structure of the proposed risk management framework follows.  
 The risk identification process, although not studied, lists various techniques and approaches to 
obtain a comprehensive list of risks.  
 The computations in risk prioritisation using AHP can become complex. Thus, such 
computation requires some prior learning before it can be used effectively.  
 It was noted that the time spent on the AHP can become significant as the number of risks 
increases. Limiting the number of risks evaluated to approximately 25 with a maximum of three 
criteria will reduce the time spent on comparisons to approximately four to six hours. If more 
than one individual performs comparisons and computations, the time spent can be significantly 
reduced. 
 Qualitative analysis of risk has been shown to be easily implemented. The simple rating systems 
associated with qualitative are widely implemented in industry have been shown to be practical, 
albeit not very descriptive, when assessing risks. 
 By contrast, quantitative methods have been shown to provide in-depth analyses of critical risks. 
However, this naturally increases the complexity of the analysis. Three concerns relating to the 
practicality of proposed quantitative methods have been noted. 
 The first is the availability of data. The framework has accommodated for a lack of data by 
incorporating expert judgement methods. These methods allow the estimation certain 
parameters in the absence of data. However reliable expert judgement is required to produce 
acceptable results. 
 The second concern is the complexity of methods. While the methods can become complex, the 
information that is provided from quantitative analysis vastly surpasses the information from 
qualitative analysis. This advantage validates the increased complexity of quantitative methods. 
The only method among the quantitative techniques that proved too complex to be practical was 
the optimum risk response strategy using the quantitative method.  
 The final concern is the time needed to complete a quantitative analysis of the risks. 
Quantitative analysis will always take longer to complete when compared to qualitative 
analysis. However, quantitative analysis provides information and an understanding of critical 
risks that qualitative analysis simply cannot. Thus the time taken to complete such analyses is 
validated. 
This discussion has shown that it is possible to incorporate both qualitative and quantitative risk 
management techniques in a systematic and practical framework. Thus the goal of the study was 
achieved. 
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7.4 Recommendations 
 The risk identification process could not be performed due to the time schedule and prior 
commitments of the employees at the company. Due to this limitation, the effectiveness and 
practically of the proposed methods could not be properly established. Further studies are 
required that incorporate the methods proposed in Chapter 3. 
 Grouping of opinions applies an importance weighting to an individual’s opinion based on their 
knowledge and expertise of topic to be discussed. Since the questionnaires were completed 
anonymously, grouping of individual opinions could not be performed. The effect of grouping 
opinions should be investigated in future studies.  
 Another concern that arose due to the anonymous nature of the data collection had to do with 
the presence of biases in the impact and likelihood rating. The ratings showed that participants 
exhibited a form of bias. If the ratings were obtained in one-on-one meeting with participants, 
biases could be detected and managed. Mitigation of biases should be investigated in further 
studies. 
 Several assumptions had to be made when the optimum risk response was determined using 
quantitative methods. These assumptions were made because the company was unable to 
provide reliable estimates for the required parameters. It was noted that the assumptions result in 
errors. However, these do not negate the main research objective of the study, which was to 
develop a systematic risk management framework that can be applied practically. Accurate 
estimates of the required parameters should be obtained to ascertain the effect on the results. 
 Objective setting has been excluded from this study for reasons presented in Chapter 1. The 
effect of objective setting processes should be investigated in future studies. 
 The complexity and dubious results produced by the quantitative method to determine the 
optimum risk response is an inherent attribute of the method. Consequently, this method is 
impractical. Future studies should consider a methodology that is less complex and can account 
for ethical considerations. 
 Non-Probabilistic impact modelling should be investigated to determine whether these methods 
can be incorporated into the proposed risk management framework. 
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APPENDIX A Questionnaires 
A.1 Risk Impact and likelihood evaluation questionnaire 
 
 
1) Inhalation of Chemicals –consider tasks involving chemical solvents/dangerous chemicals. Rate how often 
inhalation of these chemicals occur and how severe the health impact is  
IMPACT 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
     
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
 
2) Using Cell phones and Media Players – Please rate how often staff members are injured or perform tasks in 
an unsafe manner due to the use the above mentioned devices. Also rate how bad the impact is. 
IMPACT 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
     
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
 
3) Incorrect Stacking and storing practices – when parts or tools are stored incorrectly, can this result in an 
injury? If so, please state how often injuries occurs due to this and how serious the impact is. 
IMPACT 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
     
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
 
4) Injury: Repairing Vehicle Doors – how often is someone injured (shock, cuts, falls etc.) when performing the 
task? and on average how bad is the impact of the injuries. 
IMPACT 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
     
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
 
5) Contractor control – Do the contractors create situations of risk and if so, state how often it occurs how 
serious the impact is (injuries, damage to property etc.?) 
IMPACT 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
     
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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6) Abuse of assets – how often are the assets vandalised? This includes urinating in the assets. Also, state how 
bad the impact of this abuse is with respect to cost. 
IMPACT 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
     
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
 
7) Abuse/ improper use of lifting equipment – when lifting equipment is used, is it always done correctly? If 
not, please state the likelihood of improper use and the impact thereof (injury/death or equipment damages) 
IMPACT 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
     
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
 
8) Essential Equipment not working – how often does this occur and in terms of the cost to company, how 
severe is the impact? 
IMPACT 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
     
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
 
9) Material supply control – do chemical spills occur due improper handling or mistakes? If so rate it based on 
the following risks such as chemical fires, chemical solvent burns on skin etc.  
IMPACT 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
     
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
 
10) Excessive noise and dust/debris – non-operational tasks such as replacing floors, cutting grass, general 
maintenance and repairs result in dust, workplace distraction or very loud noise. Can this be a hazard? Please 
rate the following 
IMPACT 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
     
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
 
11) Broken/ Malfunctioning Fire extinguishers – can this be hazard? If so, please rate how often it occurs and 
how bad the possible consequences are. 
IMPACT 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
     
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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12) Theft of tools and other property – How often does theft occur on site, and when it does how severe are the 
consequences with respect to the cost to company or individuals? 
IMPACT 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
     
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
 
13) Staff not wearing PPE – how often do injuries occur due to staff not wearing PPE and how severe are the 
consequences? 
IMPACT 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
     
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
 
14) Procedural issues – How often do risk situations occur if proper procedure are not followed when performing 
various activities, also state how severe impact is on average.  
IMPACT 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
     
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
 
15) Injuries removing Vehicle wheels – have there been injuries while performing this task (Back injuries, cuts, 
falls etc.) in the past? If yes, how often do they occur and how severe is the impact? 
IMPACT 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
     
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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A.2 Risk Diagnosing Questionnaire 
 
 
Figure A-1: Risk Diagnosing Methodology Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk Statements
How often does the risk 
occur?
Assume the risk does occur. 
Do you think anything could 
be done to reduce/prevent 
number of occurrences?
If the risk should occur how 
severely do they affect the 
enterprise/departmental 
objectives 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
very
low
very
high Yes
no
very
low
very
high
(15) Staff Injury: Removing and replace train wheels
(16) Staff Aggression towards Supervisors: 
Supervisor abused verbally or physically 
(6) Urinating in the coaches/sets/machine rooms etc. 
poses  threat to health, respect for workplace etc
(9) Fires caused by use of Chemicals in cleaning, 
stripping of parts/trains etc.
(1) Inhalation of Chemical Fumes can lead to 
injury or death
(2) Injury/Death due use of Cellphones and/or 
Electronic Devices
(3) Incorrect Stacking of components in 
warehouse leads to injury
(13) Injury due to staff not wearing PPE
(5) Improper safety by contractors causes Injury of 
Staff/Contractor 
(7) The Improper use of Equipment( lifting or other) 
causes damage to persons or equipment
(4) Injuries during Repairing of Train Doors 
(17) Withdrawal of Contract services due to Non-
Payment( Interwaste etc.)
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
126 
Appendix A | Questionnaires  
A.3 Internal Environment Questionnaire 
 
 
1) Leadership and Strategy – The leaders of my unit set a positive example for ethical conduct.  
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
2) Leadership and Strategy – I am aware of what is expected of me in terms of the code of conduct.  
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
3) Leadership and Strategy – I understand the vision, mission and overall objectives of the enterprise/unit. 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
4) People and Communication – Teamwork and Communication between employees is promoted by the leaders 
of your unit. 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
5) People and Communication – Channels of communication to management are available 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
 
6) Accountability – Disciplinary action is taken against employees that engage in unethical conduct. 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
7) Risk Management –.Does risk management make the environment a better place to work in? 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
8) Risk Management – The risk management process is well structured 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
9) Risk management –  Risks are explicitly addressed whenever a decision is made or new task is undertaken 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
10) Risk management –Designated risk owners have the authority and ability to manage risk adequately. 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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APPENDIX B Raw Data and Preliminary Analysis 
B.1  Company Data 
Table B-1 Company risk assessment data prior to risk handling 
# 
Activity Hazard Risk Description 
Im
p
a
ct 
E
x
p
o
su
re
 
L
ik
elih
o
o
d
 
R
isk
 lev
el 
50 
Paint stripping of 
components 
Chemicals Inhalation of chemicals 
2 6 4 M 
28 
Using cell phones and media 
players 
Vehicle movement Staff member death/injury 
4 6 5 H 
15 
Stacking and storage 
practices in warehouse 
Items falling from height Staff member death/injury 
3 6 3 M 
6 
Lifting assets (60t) with 
cranes 
Crane Malfunction of machine 
5 6 5 H 
33 
Repairing vehicle doors in 
Yards 
3kV 
Electrical shock, falling, 
cuts, lacerations 
4 5 5 H 
11 
Interaction between staff and 
supervisor 
Staff aggression 
Supervisor being attacked 
by staff 
4 6 5 H 
9 
Material supply control 
(solvent) 
Chemical (fire) Vehicle can be set alight 
6 6 6 H 
42 Remove and replace wheels Heavy weight falling Staff member death/injury 4 6 2 M 
4 
Contractor control No risk assessments 
Depot/contractor staff 
injury 
5 5 5 H 
7 
Lifting assets (60t) with 
cranes 
Operator error 
Abuse/incorrect use of 
lifting equipment 
5 6 3 H 
45 
Cleaning components in the 
Steam Genny 
Chemicals Eye, skin, lung injury 
2 6 2 M 
26 
Sandblasting of components Dust 
Inhalation of dust by 
operator 
3 6 2 M 
32 
Chemical plating of 
components 
Chemicals 
Non-compliance to council 
effluent limits 
5 6 3 H 
46 
Main field coil remove and 
replace 
Heavy weight while 
bending 
Back injury 
3 4 3 M 
12 Floor replacement and 
repairs 
Noise and dust congested bronchial tubes 
4 5 5 H 
n/a Staff Control Hazardous waste Staff urinating in assets These risks had 
not yet been 
included in risk 
management 
processes 
n/a Inter waste account not 
settled 
Hazardous waste 
Staff exposed to hazardous 
waste during handling 
n/a 
Staff/contractor Control Theft 
Lack of assets/tools due to 
theft 
n/a Fire extinguishing Broken fire extinguishers Cannot put out fire 
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Table B-2 Company risk assessment data after risk handling 
# 
Mitigation 
Im
p
a
ct 
E
x
p
o
su
re
 
L
ik
elih
o
o
d
 
R
isk
 lev
el 
50 Layer of water to cover the stripping chemicals 1 5 1 L 
28 Cell phone and media player ban in operational and maintenance 3 3 2 M 
15 Training of staff; supervision by warehouse supervisor 1 6 2 M 
6 Scheduled plant maintenance. 2 6 2 M 
33 HT regulation training; written procedure; briefing system 1 5 2 M 
11 Management warning to staff; briefing system; discipline 1 6 3 M 
9 Supplier to supply certificate of conformance with delivery of orders 2 6 2 M 
42 Lifting procedure; training; maintenance schedule 1 5 1 L 
4 Contractor file; Project meetings; Service Level Agreements 2 5 3 M 
7 Crane licensing procedure; refreshers; PJO 2 6 2 M 
45 Operator is issued with PPE; PJO. 1 5 1 L 
26 PPE and training of operator; DOP 1 6 1 M 
32 Operator training; DOP; PJO: water sampling 1 6 1 M 
46 Rotating machine; DOP 1 4 2 L 
 12 PPE; PJO; DOP 2 5 2 M 
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B.2 AHP comparison matrices 
Table B-3 Comparison Matrix for risk impact 
Risk ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 1   1    1/3 3   1    1/4 1    1/5 1   2   1    1/5 2   1   4   
2 1   1    1/3 3    1/2  1/6  1/2  1/4 1    1/3 1    1/8  1/2  1/3 4   
3 3   3   1   4   1    1/2 3    1/3 5   2   3    1/2 2   2   8   
4  1/3  1/3  1/4 1    1/2  1/8  1/4  1/6 3    1/5 1    1/8 1    1/3 1   
5 1   2   1   2   1    1/4 1   4   1    1/2 2    1/4 1   1   4   
6 4   6   2   8   4   1   5   1   5   5   8    1/2 4   4   9   
7 1   2    1/3 4   1    1/5 1    1/4 1    1/2 2    1/6 1    1/2 4   
8 5   4   3   6    1/4 1   4   1   5   3   5   1   4   4   7   
9 1   1    1/5  1/3 1    1/5 1    1/5 1   2   1    1/6  1/2  1/3 3   
10  1/2 3    1/2 5   2    1/5 2    1/3  1/2 1   3    1/4 1   1   4   
11 1   1    1/3 1    1/2  1/8  1/2  1/5 1    1/3 1    1/7  1/2 1   3   
12 5   8   2   8   4   2   6   1   6   4   7   1   4   4   9   
13  1/2 2    1/2 1   1    1/4 1    1/4 2   1   2    1/4 1   1   5   
14 1   3    1/2 3   1    1/4 2    1/4 3   1   1    1/4 1   1   5   
15  1/4  1/4  1/8 1    1/4  1/9  1/4  1/7  1/3  1/4  1/3  1/9  1/5  1/5 1   
 
 
Table B-4 Comparison Matrix for risk likelihood 
Risk ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 1   2    1/3 2    1/3  1/6 1    1/6 1    1/2 2    1/6 1   1   5   
2  1/2 1    1/4 2   1/4  1/7 1   1/7 1   1/3 1   1/7 1   1/2 5  
3 3  4  1   8   1    1/2 3    1/3 3   2   6    1/3 5   3   8   
4  1/2  1/2  1/8 1    1/8  1/8  1/6  1/9  1/5  1/8  1/3  1/8  1/4  1/5 1   
5 3   4   1   8   1    1/2 2    1/2 2   1   5    1/2 3   3   8   
6 6   7   2   8   2   1   3   1   6   3   7   1   5   6   9   
7 1   1    1/3 6    1/2  1/3 1    1/4 1    1/2 2    1/8 2   1   6   
8 6   7   3   9   2   1   4   1   6   4   7   1   6     6     9     
9 1     1      1/3 5      1/2  1/6 1      1/6 1      1/2 1      1/5 1     1     6     
10 2     3      1/2 8     1      1/3 2      1/4 2     1     4      1/4 3     2     6     
11  1/2 1      1/6 3      1/5  1/7  1/2  1/7 1      1/4 1      1/5 1      1/2 2     
12 6     7     3     8     2     1     8     1     5     4     5     1     6     4     9     
13 1     1      1/5 4      1/3  1/5  1/2  1/6 1      1/3 1      1/6 1     1     6     
14 1     2      1/3 5      1/3  1/6 1      1/6 1      1/2 2      1/4 1     1     6     
15  1/5  1/5  1/8 1      1/8  1/9  1/6  1/9  1/6  1/6  1/2  1/9  1/6  1/6 1     
 
B.3 Completed Risk profiles (next page) 
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Table B-5 Risk Diagnosing Methodology completed profile 
Risk Statements 
How often does the risk occur Assume the risk does occur. Do 
you think anything can be done 
to reduce/prevent the number of 
occurrences 
Should the risk occur, how 
severely does it affect the 
enterprise/ departmental 
objectives Question  
 
Class 
C
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v
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1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5    
The improper use of equipment 
(lifting or other) causes damage 
to persons or equipment. 
N. Resp 5 2 6 1 0 8 3 1 1 0 0 1 2 3 7        
cum% 36 50 93 100 100 62 85 92 100 100 0 8 23 46 100 0 0 * L 
+50%  ●    ●        ●         
Urinating in the assets poses a 
threat to health and respect for 
the workplace. 
N. Resp 0 2 2 3 5 4 3 3 0 1 0 0 1 6 4        
cum% 0 17 33 58 100 36 64 91 91 100 0 0 9 64 100 * ? * H – F  
+50%    ●   ●       ●         
Staff aggression towards 
supervisors: Supervisors abused 
verbally or physically. 
N. Resp 0 6 3 1 4 5 3 4 1 0 0 0 1 3 9        
cum% 0 43 64 71 100 38 62 92 100 100 0 0 8 31 100 ? 0 * L – H 
+50%   ●    ●        ●        
Fire caused by use of chemicals 
in cleaning or stripping of parts 
/ vehicles etc. 
N. Resp 7 5 1 0 1 2 4 5 2 0 0 1 6 1 5        
cum% 50 86 93 93 100 15 46 85 100 100 0 8 54 62 100 ? 0 ? S – H  
+50% ●      ●      ●          
Inhalation of chemical fumes 
can lead to injury or death. 
N. Resp 3 2 1 4 2 7 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 7        
cum% 25 42 50 83 100 64 91 91 100 100 0 0 9 36 100 ? 0 * L – H  
+50%   ●   ●         ●       
Injury / death due to the use of 
cell phones and/or other 
electronic devices 
N. Resp 7 3 3 1 0 5 2 3 3 0 0 1 2 3 7        
cum% 50 71 93 100 100 38 54 77 100 100 0 8 23 46 100 0 0 * L 
+50% ●      ●       ●        
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Table B-6 Risk Diagnosing Methodology completed profile (continued) 
Risk Statements  
How often does the risk occur Assume the risk does occur. Do 
you think anything can be done 
to reduce/prevent the number of 
occurrences 
Should the risk occur, how 
severely does it affect the 
enterprise/ departmental 
objectives Question 
Class 
C
at
eg
o
ry
 
ra
re
 
u
n
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k
e
ly
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li
k
el
y
 
C
er
ta
in
 
d
ef
in
it
el
y
 
y
es
 
p
o
ss
ib
ly
 
d
if
fi
cu
lt
 
n
o
th
in
g
 
in
si
g
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
m
in
im
a
l 
ca
u
ti
o
n
 
si
g
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
se
v
er
e
 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5    
Incorrect stacking of 
components in warehouse leads 
to injury. 
N. Resp 2 7 2 1 2 8 1 2 2 0 0 1 4 0 8         
cum% 14 64 79 86 100 62 69 85 100 100 0 8 38 38 100 ? 0 * L-H 
+50%  ●    ●         ●        
Withdrawal of contract services 
due to non-payment 
(Interwaste, etc.) 
N. Resp 0 2 1 3 8 9 1 3 0 0 0 0 1 2 10         
cum% 0 14 21 43 100 69 77 100 100 100 0 0 8 23 100 * 0 * M 
+50%     ● ●         ●        
Injury due to staff not wearing 
PPE 
N. Resp 4 5 2 2 1 5 4 2 1 1 0 1 2 6 4         
cum% 29 64 79 93 100 38 69 85 92 100 0 8 23 69 100 ? ? * L-F 
+50%  ●     ●       ●         
Staff Injury while removing and 
replacing vehicle wheels 
N. Resp 4 4 3 0 0 3 4 2 0 2 0 1 2 4 4         
cum% 36 73 100 100 100 27 64 82 82 100 0 9 27 64 100 0 ? * L-M 
+50%  ●     ●       ●         
Contractor Control: Contractors 
cause injury of staff / contractor 
due to poor safety behaviour 
N. Resp 3 5 3 1 1 2 6 1 1 3 1 1 2 5 4         
cum% 23 62 85 92 100 15 62 69 77 100 8 15 31 69 100 ? ? ? S-F 
+50%  ●     ●       ●         
Injuries while repairing vehicle 
doors 
N. Resp 5 4 2 0 0 3 3 3 1 1 0 1 3 2 5         
cum% 45 82 100 100 100 27 55 82 91 100 0 9 36 55 100 0 ? * L-M 
+50% ●      ●       ●          
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
132 
Appendix C | Calculated Data and Auxiliary Figures 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Fr
e
q
u
e
n
cy
 
bins 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Fr
e
q
u
e
n
cy
 
Bins 
APPENDIX C Calculated Data and Auxiliary Figures 
C.1 Stacking and Storing Impact Frequency Data 
 
 
 
C.2 Contractor Control Impact Frequency Data 
 
 
 
class Bins(rands) Frequency 
1 12293-17590 1 
2 17591-22888 61 
3 22889-28186 196 
4 28187-33484 522 
5 33485-38783 835 
6 38783-44080 1121 
7 44081-49378 1306 
8 49379-54676 1358 
9 54677-59974 1300 
10 59975-65272 1152 
11 65273-70570 846 
12 70571-75868 682 
13 75869-81166 359 
14 81167-86464 174 
15 86465-91762 70 
16 91763+ 17 
class Bins(rands) Frequency 
1 22430-83351 1 
2 83352-144273 75 
3 144274-205195 377 
4 205196-266117 853 
5 266118-327039 1183 
6 327040-387961 1378 
7 387962-448883 1377 
8 448884-509805 1415 
9 509806-570727 1156 
10 570728-631649 891 
11 631650-692572 634 
12 692572-753493 338 
13 753494-814415 202 
14 814416-875337 87 
15 875338-936259 28 
16 936260+ 5 
 
 
Figure C-1: Stacking and storing impact frequency 
 
Figure C-2: Contractor control impact frequency 
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C.3 Stacking and storing Likelihood Frequency data 
 
 
 
C.4 Contractor Control Likelihood Frequency data 
 
 
 
 
class bins Frequency 
1 0.109-0.131 1 
2 0.132-0.154 6 
3 0.155-0.176 64 
4 0.177-0.199 269 
5 0.200-0.221 813 
6 0.222-0.244 1518 
7 0.245-0.267 1963 
8 0.268-0.289 2033 
9 0.290-0.312 1578 
10 0.313-0.334 983 
11 0.335-0.357 491 
12 0.358-0.380 183 
13 0.381-0.402 79 
14 0.403-0.425 15 
15 0.426-0.447 3 
16 0.448+ 1 
class bins Frequency 
1 0.163-0.197 1 
2 0.198-0.232 3 
3 0.233-0.267 42 
4 0.268-0.301 179 
5 0.302-0.336 536 
6 0.337-0.371 1073 
7 0.372-0.406 1671 
8 0.407-0.441 1950 
9 0.442-0.475 1828 
10 0.476-0.510 1360 
11 0.511-0.545 756 
12 0.546-0.580 415 
13 0.581-0.615 139 
14 0.616-0.649 41 
15 0.650-0.684 4 
16 0.685+ 2 
 
 
Figure C-3: Stacking and storing likelihood frequency 
Figure C-4: Contractor control likelihood frequency 
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C.5 Expected Losses  
 
Table C-1: Expected losses frequency data 
Inhalation of chemicals Stacking and Storing Contractor Control 
class bins Freq class bins Freq class bins Freq 
1 85-260 1 1 2069-4044 1 1 6768-38788 1 
2 261-436 140 2 4045-6020 62 2 38789-70809 169 
3 437-612 946 3 6021-7996 473 3 70810-10830 850 
4 613-788 1855 4 7997-9972 1141 4 102831-134851 1487 
5 789-964 2189 5 9973-11948 1663 5 134852-166872 1814 
6 965-1140 1776 6 11949-13924 1919 6 166873-198893 1747 
7 1141-1316 1311 7 13925-15900 1702 7 198894-230914 1451 
8 1317-1492 845 8 15901-17876 1221 8 230915-262935 1103 
9 1493-1668 467 9 17877-19852 886 9 262936-294956 707 
10 1669-1844 259 10 19853-21828 502 10 294957-326978 345 
11 1845-2020 114 11 21829-23804 256 11 326978-358998 195 
12 2021-2196 50 12 23805-25780 107 12 358999-391019 85 
13 2197-2372 27 13 25781-27756 51 13 391020-423040 28 
14 2373-2548 12 14 27757-29732 9 14 423041-455061 11 
15 2549-2724 6 15 29733-31708 3 15 455062-487082 5 
16 2725+ 2 16 31709+ 4 16 487083 2 
 
 
 
Figure C-5: Stacking and storing cumulative probability distribution 
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Figure C-6 : Contractor control cumulative probability distribution 
 
C.6 Process analysis tool  
 
 
Figure C-7: Example Process analysis tool 
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4. Necessary 
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7. Cleaned component 
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2. Uncleaned 
Component 
is collected
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A. Uncleaned 
Component at 
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8. Cleaned component 
stacked and/or stored 
in warehouse
5. Solvents to 
cleaning station
Component 
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C.7  Trigger list 
1. Describe the Problem 
a. What is the problem? 
b. When can it happen? 
2. Categorise the problem 
a. is the problem related to: 
i. finances 
ii. operations 
iii. enterprise structure 
iv. reputation 
v. legal and compliance factors 
3. How often does the problem occur 
4. How can the impact be measured 
5. Is there anything that can be done to prevent this problem 
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APPENDIX D Probability Distributions 
 
Figure D-1: Common Probability Density Functions 
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Table D-1 Mechanistic considerations of probability density functions 
PDF Mechanistic Considerations Typical Examples 
Beta  Estimates a continuous random variable with 
finite lower and upper limits. This distribution 
can take on very flexible shapes. 
Mass fraction of an impurity in a 
metal sample bounded by 0 and 100%. 
Binomial Estimates a discrete random variable with the 
properties: (1) occurs in a fixed number of 
identical repetitions; (2) each repetition yields 
one of two elementary outcomes (e.g., 
―success‖ or ―failure‖) and (3) has constant 
probability of success. 
The number die tosses before a given 
number of successes are observed. A 
success is tossing a certain value 
Poisson Models occurrence of random, independent 
discrete events. Approximates the binomial 
distribution when number of repetitions is 
large and probability of success is small. 
Determining the probably that 1 
product is defective in a sample of 
1000. Given that the manufacturing 
process of the product is strictly 
controlled. 
Exponential  The measured quantity is the time/distance 
between successive events. 
For a strict manufacturing process, the 
time between defective products 
produced. 
Gamma  Analogous to exponential, except that the 
measured quantity is distance/time until the 
k
th
 success is observed instead of the time 
between successive events. 
Time until the k
th
 defect is found for a 
given number of products produced. 
Exponential  Determining the number of sample until ―k‖ 
successes is observed in a given population. 
For a strict manufacturing process, the 
probability that ―k‖ defective products 
will be found for a given number of 
samples. 
Log-Normal Multiplication of random variables, or 
addition of logarithmic variables, will tend to 
yield a lognormal distribution. 
The risk threat severity equation is 
multiplicative, and thus will generally 
produce a log-normal distribution.  
Triangular  The PDF has a triangular shape. This is a 
rudimentary probability model that describes 
a random variable based on limited 
information. 
Variability in a project cost given 
limited information. 
Uniform  The PDF has rectangular shape. This is a 
simple probability model that generally 
describes a random variable based on limited 
information.  
Used when all values have the same 
probability to be observed. Rolling a 
fair die.  
Weibull  A model to estimate for time to failure of a 
product when the failure rate varies with time.   
Examples for exponential and gamma 
would also be appropriate for Weibull. 
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APPENDIX E Detailed Interview Processes 
E.1  Introduction 
The introduction phase has two purposes. The first is to introduce the task, which involves clarifying the 
objectives of the interview, stating the importance of the data and the purpose of the results. The second 
purpose of the introduction is to determine whether the responses of the participant are influenced by 
motivational biases.  
The interviewer and participant should discuss any benefits that the participant might acquire from the 
interview results. The interviewer should also point out that the aim of the interview process is to obtain 
results that clearly represent the judgement of the participant. Misrepresenting the data will be 
detrimental to the entire risk management process. The participant should also be informed that 
performance will not be judged during or after the process. 
E.2  Structuring  
The purpose of the structuring phase is to explain the procedures that will be followed in the interview 
and to define the uncertain data. In this study, the uncertain data will be risk events. The interviewer 
should then provide a definition for risk and ascertain whether the participant has received the 
background material in advance.  
The participant is asked to analyse any processes presented in the background material carefully before 
presenting scenarios that lead to risk event. If the participant struggles to visualise scenarios later in the 
interview, the interviewer can lead him/her in a specific direction. 
E.3  Opening Phase 
The aim of the opening phase is to address any cognitive biases that may surface during the event 
identification and to condition the participant to think carefully about judgements. This phase should be 
directed towards determining the basis of the participant’s judgements. The basis for judgement provides 
information regarding the presence of anchors, the unstated assumptions, the most available information 
and so forth. 
The following questions have been adapted from (Spetzler & Holstein 1975). These questions can be 
used to determine the bases for judgement and detecting the subsequent biases: 
 How do you judge whether a risk is probable or not? In other words, what are your bases for 
judgement? 
It has been found that the bases for event identification will often be associated, either directly or 
indirectly, to risks that have been identified previously. These prior events could become anchors. 
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 What information do you consider when presenting a scenario or identifying a risk? 
This will be indicative of the information that is readily available to the participant. If the interviewer 
suspects that the participant is relying on recently obtained information, the participant can be asked to 
think about extreme or unlikely scenarios. 
 If you would like to revise any judgements, please specify the reason for doing so, and mention 
how revision affects your previous judgement? 
Representativeness can occur when the participant requests to revise a previous judgement based on new 
knowledge, thoughts or ideas obtained during the interview process. The best way to handle this 
situation is to ask the participant to specify the reason for revision of the judgement and state how 
revision affects the previous judgement. The interviewer does not disregard the previous judgement.  
 Are there any risk events you feel are not your responsibility to identify? For example, acts of 
God 
This questions requests that the participant specify all assumptions that are made when making 
judgements. It also helps the interviewer to understand and document the range of uncertainties the 
participant is willing to discuss.  
 Do you visualise scenarios that lead to risk events? If so, why do you do this? 
This will indicate if a participant is identifying risk events based on whether he/she can construct 
plausible scenarios leading to a risk event. Coherence of a scenario can influence the judgements of an 
individual.  
 What do you consider to be extreme or unlikely risk events with respect to the process in 
question? 
This is a deliberate use of availability that is intended to reduce the effects of anchoring that is likely to 
occur. The interviewer then asks the participant to consider extreme scenarios that may lead to risk 
events. Asking the participant to consider extremes has the effect of increasing the variability of 
judgements. Variability in risk identification is good as it results in a diverse range of risk events. 
E.4  Risk Identification 
The attention of the participant is drawn to the process diagram (See Appendix C). The interviewer 
should not begin by asking the participant to identify the most likely risks. This may result in anchoring 
and adjustment. The participant likely to identify risks that are common or that have occurred recently. 
To increase the variability of results, the interviewer can ask the participant to consider extreme cases. 
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If the participant uses constructed scenarios to identify potential risk events, the interviewer should be 
attentive and check if the participant is struggling to construct plausible scenarios. In some cases, the 
coherence of a scenario leading to a risk event takes precedence over probability risk event. If the 
interviewer detects equally coherent scenarios that imply the risk event is improbable can be formulated 
by the interviewer. This may change the judgement of the participant in favour of the relevant risks. 
The order in which risks are identified is determined by the situation. If the participant is more familiar 
with a specific area of the process or type of risk, then the interviewer should start there and gradually 
move towards less familiar areas. The length of the identification phase will depend on the ability of the 
participant to identify risk events. The interviewer should note any changes in the participant’s attention 
and spend enough time with each of the participants in order to obtain the large number risks (Keizer, 
Halman & Song 2002). 
E.5  Verification 
The last stage of the interview process is verification of the results. The interviewer and participant 
analyse the list of risks. If the participant is not satisfied with the data then some of the steps in the 
interview process can be repeated.  
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APPENDIX F Glossary of terms 
Table F-1: Frequently used terms 
Terms Description 
Risk An uncertain event that, should it occur, will have an effect on the 
achievement of the enterprise objectives 
Appetite, Risk The level of risk the enterprise is willing to accept in order to achieve its 
objectives 
Assessment, Risk Process that includes estimation of risk impact and likelihood, prioritisation 
of risks and risk criticality  
Category, Risk Indication of the risk threat level 
Classification, Risk Indication of how the risk affects the enterprise 
Controllability, Risk Measure of the ability to reduce the expected loss 
Controls, Risk Specific activities implemented to mitigate risks. 
Corporate culture Operational norms within the enterprise 
Critical Risks Risks that are not well understood or cannot be controlled.  
Criticality, Risk Indicates whether a risk is critical or not 
Expected Loss Product of the risk impact and likelihood.  
Expert Judgement Opinion of an individual that is knowledgeable within a given area of 
expertise 
Frequency Number of observations of a given quantity 
Impact, Risk The actual loss associated with a risk. Usually expressed in monetary terms 
Internal Environment Encompasses, the corporate culture as well as ethics, honesty and integrity 
of individuals within the enterprise 
Likelihood, Risk Probability of occurrence of the risk event 
Management, Risk Defined as the systematic process of identifying, assessing and responding 
to risk events  
Non-Critical Risks Risks that are well understood or can be controlled 
Owner, Risk An individual responsible for implementation of risk controls 
Participant An individual at The Company that took part in this study 
Prioritisation, Risk Rank ordering or risks in  terms of  perceived importance 
Probability Density Function A predictive model that is used to describe to a data set 
Qualitative Methods Methods that rely on subjective judgement to form conclusions  
Quantitative Methods Methods that rely on numerical data to form conclusions 
Response/handling strategy, Risk  The type of approach taken when responding to a risk 
The Company The enterprise that provided data for the case study.  
Threat Level, Risk Analogous to expected loss. Except that the terminology threat level used 
when using qualitative methods 
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